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GOOD LAWS FOR JUNK FAX? GOVERNMENT
REGULATION OF UNSOLICITED
SOLICITATIONS
Adam Zitter*
INTRODUCTION

Financial crisis. War. Telemarketing.' Seeing this threesome,
William Shakespeare might muse that "[m]isery acquaints a man with
strange bedfellows." 2 Barely twenty-four hours after a federal district
court ruled on September 23, 2003 that the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") lacked explicit congressional authority to
implement
the
national
do-not-call
registry,3
Congress
overwhelmingly passed legislation aimed specifically at countering
that conclusion.' In a reference to the fifty million phone lines that
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Fordham University School of Law. B.A., 2001, University of
Pennsylvania. I want to thank Professor Abner Greene for providing me with a
background in Supreme Court commercial speech jurisprudence, and for helping me
to frame the issues in this Note. I am grateful to my family, Hillary and Bob Zitter,
Sarah, Stuart, and Joshua Milstein, and to Elana Koss for all their love and support.
1. See Caroline E. Mayer, Call List Is Again Blocked in Court: Order Comes
After Congress Votes to Protect Registry, Wash. Post, Sept. 26, 2003, at Al
("Congress's action was unusually swift; congressional historians could recall
lawmakers previously acting so quickly only in times of financial crisis and war.").
2. William Shakespeare, The Tempest act 2, sc. 2, lines 38-39 (Virginia Mason
Vaughan & Alden T. Vaughan eds., The Arden Shakespeare 2000) (1623). The
quoted passage is uttered by Trinculo, a character who is stranded on an island, as he
takes shelter beside a sleeping monster during a storm. Perhaps the saying that
"politics makes strange bedfellows" is even more apropos.
3. See U.S. Security v. FTC, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1290-91 (W.D. Okla. 2003)
(holding that Congress had only delegated authority to establish a national do-not-call
registry to the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")-and not to the
FTC-by way of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act); The No-Call Catch-22,
Wash. Post, Sept. 30, 2003, at A18 ("Congress took barely 24 hours to make sure the
commission had the power it needs-and President Bush signed the new law
yesterday.").
4. Act of Sept. 29, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-82, 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. (117 Stat.) 1006
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6102 note) (ratifying the authority of the Federal Trade
Commission to establish a do-not-call registry). Congress approved the Act on
September 25, 2003. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Matt Richtel, Do-Not-Call Listing
Remains Up in Air After Day of Twists, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 2003, at Al. President
Bush signed the new law on September 29, 2003. Editorial, The No-Call Catch-22,
supra note 3.
The Act plainly states, "The Federal Trade Commission is
authorized ... to implement and enforce a national do-not-call registry." Act of Sept.
29, 2003, § 1(a), 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. (117 Stat.) at 1006 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
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had been placed on the list since registration began on June 26, 2003,'
New York Democratic Senator Charles Schumer seemed to echo the
rationale that propelled
congressional action: 'Fifty million people
6
can't be all wrong.",'

Indeed, the national do-not-call registry and other similar state and
federal initiatives that are aimed at curbing or eliminating various
forms of unsolicited
communications-which,
along with

telemarketing, include junk faxing7 and spamming 8-currently enjoy
enormous popularity with the American public. These initiatives are

so popular that Congress treated one of their targeted modes of
unsolicited
communication - telemarketing- as
tantamount
to
financial crisis or war.9
Rapid and resolute as it was, Congress's successful defense of the
national do-not-call registry was also short-lived. On September 25,
2003, the same day that the bill passed the House and Senate, 10 a
different federal district court invalidated the do-not-call registry on

constitutional grounds. 1 Still, the registry's status remained in limbo

6102 note). Congressional support for the bill was nearly unanimous: it passed by a
vote of ninety-five to zero in the Senate and 412 to eight in the House of
Representatives. Stolberg & Richtel, supra.
5. Stolberg & Richtel, supra note 4. By February 2004, more than 57.2 million
phone numbers had been placed on the do-not-call registry. Caroline E. Mayer,
National No-Call List Upheld by Court: Judges See No Violation of Telemarketers'
Rights, Wash. Post, Feb. 18, 2004, at El.
6. Mayer, supra note 1.
7. Junk fax has been described as "'the electronic equivalent of junk mail' and
"the sending of unsolicited advertisements to telephone facsimile machines." David
E. Sorkin, Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail and the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act of 1991, 45 Buff. L. Rev. 1001, 1001 & n.7 (1997) (citations omitted).
8. Sources commonly attribute the origin of the term "spam" as denoting
unsolicited commercial or non-commercial e-mail to a Monty Python skit in which
diners try to order from a menu that contains nothing but the canned meat product
SPAM. See, e.g., Credence E. Fogo, The Postman Always Rings 4,000 Times: New
Approaches to Curb Spam, 18 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 915, 918 (2000)
(citing Monty Python's Flying Circus: The Spam Sketch (BBC television broadcast,
Dec. 15, 1970)). Fogo explains the connection as follows: "The link between Monty
Python's beleaguered diners and email users is that, as in the sketch, inappropriate,
unwanted, and exceedingly numerous spam messages can overwhelm wanted
communiqu6s: legitimate email can become impossible to separate from the spain."
Id.
9. See supra note 1.
10. For a discussion of the dates of congressional passage and presidential
signature, see supra note 4.
11. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1168 (D. Colo.
2003) (holding that the registry burdens only one type of speech -commercial
speech-without a "privacy-based or prevention-of-abuse-based reason supporting
the disparate treatment of different categories of speech"), stay denied by 284 F.
Supp. 2d 1266 (D. Colo. 2003), stay granted by 345 F.3d 850 (10th Cir. 2003), rev'd,
358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004); see also The No-Call Catch-22, supra note 3 ("While
the program prohibits commercial telemarketing calls, [the district court judge] ruled,
it exempts political and charitable solicitations-thus discriminating against
commercial speech.").
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for over four months; 2 it went into effect on October 1, 2003, pending
the outcome of the appeal of this second district court ruling. 3
On February 17, 2004, the Tenth Circuit issued a decision on that
appeal, upholding the do-not-call registry.' 4 Nevertheless, the legal
journey of the registry is not quite over. Telemarketing industry
representatives are considering an appeal to the Tenth Circuit en banc
or to the Supreme Court. 5
Two questions arise from these circumstances. First, is the national
do-not-call registry itself constitutional?
Second, what are the
implications of the registry's legal troubles for regulation of other
unsolicited communications, namely, spam and junk faxing?
The second inquiry is particularly relevant if the national do-notcall registry is indeed constitutional, as the Tenth Circuit has held. 6
Commentators in both the anti-spain and direct marketing
communities have considered the possibility that spam may increase
as a result of the regulation of telemarketing under the do-not-call
registry. 7
Perhaps in light of this consideration, various
12. The federal district court had permanently enjoined the FTC from enforcing
the do-not-call registry. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1171.
However, the Tenth Circuit stayed that injunction, permitting the FTC to enforce the
registry until the court could decide the case on the merits. Mainstream Mktg. Servs.,
Inc., 345 F.3d at 861, staying 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1151, rev'd, 358 F.3d at 1228. In that
October 7, 2003 stay opinion, the Tenth Circuit ordered "that the petition for review
on the merits be expedited." Id. Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit issued a decision on
the merits over four months later, on February 17, 2004. See infra note 14 and
accompanying text.
13. Matt Richtel, F.C.C. Plans to Enforce No-Call Rules, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 2003,
at C10 ("[The FCC] told a Senate committee yesterday that [it] planned to enforce a
national do-not-call registry starting today despite logistical complications caused by a
federal judge's ruling."). The FCC was not itself barred from enforcing the registry,
because it was not a party to the district court case and the permanent injunction
applied to the FTC only. See Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1171
("The clerk shall enter judgment... enjoining the FTC from enforcing the amended
Rules... creating and implementing a federal do-not-call registry .... ); Richtel,
supra ("[T]he F.C.C. said that it would assume enforcement of the registry because it
had not been blocked by the courts from doing so."). However, the district court
judge complicated the FCC's enforcement plans by ordering the FTC-subsequent to
the district court decision-not to share the do-not-call list. Id. Such complications
became inconsequential, however, with the issuance of the Tenth Circuit's stay
opinion. See supra note 12.
14. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 358 F.3d at 1232-33.
15. Mayer, supra note 5; David Stout, Court Upholds Telemarketing Restrictions,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 2004, at C3. However, the Supreme Court may not grant
certiorari on such an appeal because there is not yet-and perhaps there will never
be-any disagreement between United States courts of appeals on the matter. Id.
16. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
17. John B. Kennedy & Trey Hatch, Recent Developments in Consumer Privacy:
Focus on Spain and Identity Theft, in Fourth Annual Institute on Privacy Law:
Protecting Your Client in a Security-Conscious World 1219, 1236 (2003)
("Commentators from both anti-spain and direct marketing sources have offered
different predictions on whether spam will increase as a result, or, if so, whether the
increase will be perceptible.").
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commentators recommended
the implementation of a national do18
not-sparn registry.
In accordance with these recommendations, President Bush signed
into law on December 16, 2003 the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003,19 which,
among other things, authorizes the FTC to plan and ultimately
implement a "nationwide marketing Do-Not-E-Mail registry. '2 But
perhaps the enormous quantity of spam,2' its estimated annual cost to
U.S. corporations,2 2 and growing Internet user intolerance of the
practice 23 call for a more extreme solution to the problem: an outright
federal ban on spam. California adopted a state version of such a
measure in September 2003.24 However, that law, and others like it

18. See, e.g., Dannielle Cisneros, Do Not Advertise: The Current Fight Against
Unsolicited Advertisements, 2003 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 10,
14 (Apr. 29, 2003)
("Taking into account the recent legislation against telemarketing phone calls, it
might be an opportune time to institute a 'Do Not E-Mail' registry."), at
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2003dltrOOlO.html.
19. CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. (117 Stat.)
2699 (to be codified in part at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713). "CAN-SPAM Act of 2003" is
an acronym and alternative title for the "Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited
Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003." Id. § 1, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. (117 Stat.) at
2699 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7701 note).
20. Id. § 9(a)(1), 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. (117 Stat.) at 2716 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 7708).
21. Kennedy & Hatch, supra note 17, at 1221 ("Unsolicited commercial e-mail, or
'spam', now comprises 41% of all Internet e-mail, according to a study by Brightmail,
an [sic] software company that blocks spain.").
22. Kennedy and Hatch describe the yearly cost of spam to U.S. companies as
follows:
A study by Ferris Research, [a San Francisco consulting firm,] reported in
January 2003, quantifies the annual cost of spain to U.S. corporations at $8.9
billion. The figure was based on the time it takes for recipients to detect and
dispose of messages, as well as the cost to companies of having to dedicate
additional servers, bandwidth, and staff time to accommodate unsolicited email.
Id.
23. Kennedy and Hatch discuss the Harris poll that details the popular backlash
against spain:
Internet users are increasingly intolerant of spam, according to a Harris poll
released in January 2003. The poll found that among those who use e-mail,
80% now find spamming "very annoying", up from 49% who felt this way in
2000. According to the poll, 74% of e-mail users now favor making mass
spamming illegal.
Id.
24. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.2 (West Supp. 2004). The statute states:
[A] person or entity may not... (a) Initiate or advertise in an unsolicited
commercial e-mail advertisement from California or advertise in an
unsolicited commercial e-mail advertisement sent from California ...[or]
(b) Initiate or advertise in an unsolicited commercial e-mail advertisement
to a California electronic mail address, or advertise in an unsolicited
commercial e-mail advertisement sent to a California electronic mail
address.
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that are more aggressive than the federal CAN-SPAM Act," have
been preempted by the passage of the federal act.26
In designing legislation, governments can approach solicitations2 7
from two coexistent perspectives. First, pertaining to regulation type,
legislators can elect to ban solicitations altogether, or permit the
public to opt out of receiving solicitations by signing a governmentenforced registry. Second, relating to content base, lawmakers can
address either one type of solicitation-e.g., commercial speech-or
multiple types simultaneously. These two perspectives produce four
distinct possibilities of unsolicited solicitation regulation.
This Note examines which of these four possibilities are
constitutional under the First Amendment, insofar as they involve
state and federal regulations of unsolicited fax, e-mail, and telephone
solicitations.
The question is particularly intriguing given the
Supreme Court's historic distaste for content-based regulationsa2 its
apparent likelihood of invalidating bans on unsolicited solicitations,2 9
its evolution towards near-strict scrutiny protection of commercial
speech,3" its tendency to guard residential privacy,3" and its embrace of
both government facilitation of consumer choice and government
speech.32
This
Note
approaches
the
regulations
of unsolicited
communications categorically, with each category embodying a

25. The California law bans all unsolicited commercial e-mail, whereas the federal
law regulates fraudulent or deceptive messages only. See infra notes 146-47 and
accompanying text.
26. CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, Pub. Law. No. 108-187, § 8(b)(1), 2004
U.S.C.C.A.N. (117 Stat.) at 2716 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7707). The preemption
provision states:
This Act supersedes any statute, regulation, or rule of a State or political
subdivision of a State that expressly regulates the use of electronic mail to
send commercial messages, except to the extent that any such statute,
regulation, or rule prohibits falsity or deception in any portion of a
commercial electronic mail message or information attached thereto.
Id.
27. As used in this Note, the term "solicitation" denotes a request for money.
However, there are at least three different types of solicitations: (1) solicitations for a
product or service, such as a request to purchase encyclopedias; (2) solicitations for a
political cause, such as a request to support financially President Bush's reelection
campaign; and (3) solicitations for charity, such as a request to donate money to the
March of Dimes. This Note addresses scenarios where such solicitations are
"unsolicited" -that is, without prior invitation by the recipient. Thus, the phrase
"unsolicited commercial speech" implicates solicitation type one only-i.e., that for a
product or service. When the Note speaks of "all unsolicited speech," it refers to
solicitation types one, two, and three collectively.
28. See infra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 203-08 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 167-88 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 101-03, 234-36 and accompanying text.
32. See infra Part II.B.3.
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unique combination of regulation type33 and degree of content foCUS.3 4
In Category I, federal bans on all unsolicited solicitations-including
federal prohibitions on all residence-targeted telemarketing, all
unsolicited bulk e-mail, and all unsolicited faxing-would be held
constitutional by the Supreme Court.35 In contrast, Category II
regulations-involving federal bans on unsolicited commercial
solicitations only-would be invalidated by the Court.3 6 Moreover,
Category III's federal opt-out systems pertaining to all unsolicited
speech do not offend the Constitution.3 7 However, the federal opt-out
systems that concern commercial speech only, as addressed by
Category IV, would not survive Supreme Court scrutiny.3 8
Despite these findings, however, this Note recommends that the
federal government should not adopt a junk fax provision that is more
aggressive than the current law because the decline in junk fax
following the adoption of that law renders such a measure
unnecessary. 39 This Note also urges a cautionary approach to
telemarketing regulation beyond the national do-not-call registry, in
order to allow the registry to reveal its potential for success over
time.' Yet in the case of spam, this Note advocates the expeditious
adoption of a federal ban on all spam and presents an argument for
the constitutionality of such a ban.4'
I. FORMS OF UNSOLICITED COMMUNICATION AND THE
GOVERNMENT MEASURES THAT ADDRESS THEM

This part first examines three different types of unsolicited
communication:
telemarketing, junk faxing, and spam. It then
analyzes the various forms of statutory regulation of such modes of
unsolicited communication, beginning with a look at the government
interests involved, followed by a discussion of some measures taken
by state and federal governments.

33, Categories I and II involve outright federal bans. Categories III and IV
address opt-out systems.
34. Categories II and IV relate to regulations of unsolicited commercial speech
only. Categories I and III concern regulations of all unsolicited speech regardless of
content.
35. See infra Part III.B.1.
36. See infra Part III.B.2.
37. See infra Part III.C.1.
38. See infra Part III.C.2.
39. See infra Part III.D.1.
40. See infra Part III.D.2.
41. See infra Part III.D.3.
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A. The Various Modes of Unsolicited Communication
1. Telemarketing
Of the three different types of unsolicited communication
addressed in this Note, telemarketing is unique in that, despite its
numerous opponents, it nevertheless provides a quantifiably
significant economic benefit. In 2002, telemarketing was estimated to
be a $668 billion-a-year industry, providing six million jobs.42 One of
the eight representatives to vote against the do-not-call legislation that
sped through Congress was Representative Lee Terry (R-NE), who
claimed that the telemarketing industry is the source of jobs, whether
directly or indirectly, for 39,000 of his constituents.43 Terry explained,
"'I understand it's annoying .... But I come from a district where

that annoyance is putting bread on somebody's table.""'
Still, those who must interrupt their own bread-breaking to answer
a telemarketer's call are voicing their disgust. With eighty to ninety
4 5
percent of all large businesses currently engaging in telemarketing,
telemarketing industry representatives estimate that the average
consumer received 2.64 telemarketing calls per week prior to the
implementation of the do-not-call registry, which translated into 137
calls annually.4 6 This inundation of telemarketing calls earned
telemarketing a fourth-ranked spot on Time magazine's poll of the
100 worst ideas of the twentieth century.47 It also spawned4 a huge
grassroots response to register for the national do-not-call list.
42. Patricia Pattison & Anthony F. McGann, State Telemarketing Legislation: A
Whole Lotta Law Goin' On!, 3 Wyo. L. Rev. 167, 171 (2003). Telemarketing industry
representatives claim the industry currently employs six-and-a-half million people.
Stout, supra note 15. Though the junk fax and spain industries clearly are sources of
employment, the literature is silent on this fact, suggesting that the numbers of jobs
they each respectively provide pale in comparison to that of the telemarketing
industry.
43. Stolberg & Richtel, supra note 4. Telemarketing industry representatives
predict that the national do-not-call registry will force the layoff of up to two million
telemarketers. Stout, supra note 15.
44. Stolberg & Richtel, supra note 4.
45. Pattison & McGann, supra note 42, at 171.
46. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228, 1240 (10th Cir. 2004).
Another source estimates that the average household receives over nineteen calls
annually, but that figure is from 2000. See Pattison & McGann, supra note 42, at 171
(citing Philip Kotler, Marketing Management 661 (10th ed. 2000)). Even if the latter
estimate was accurate when current, the discrepancy most likely reflects the five-fold
increase in telemarketing calls between 1991 and 2003. See Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) of 1991, 68 Fed. Reg.
44144, 44152 (July 25, 2003) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 64 & 68); Mainstream
Mktg. Servs., Inc., 358 F.3d at 1240.
47. Ian Ayres & Matthew Funk, Marketing Privacy, 20 Yale J. on Reg. 77, 79
(2003).
48. The Do Not Call Registry: A New Internet Democracy?, Economist, July 26,
2003, at 32, 32. The advent of computerized "predictive dialers" in the late 1990s
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2. Junk Faxing
If the telemarketing debate is characterized by two distinctly cogent
arguments, namely, economic benefit and annoyance, the practice of
junk faxing suffered a relatively quick and quiet demise. Even prior
to the current legislative constraints on junk faxing, the practice
suffered from inherent limitations of the kind to which e-mail and
telemarketing-at least subsequent to the development of so-called
"predictive dialers"-are immune.4 9 After all, a fax advertiser was
restricted in the number of faxes it could send by the number of
telephone lines the advertiser leased."
Still, the various costs and inconveniences suffered by the junk fax
recipient51 effected the congressional passage of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991 ("TCPA"), which, among other
things, banned altogether unsolicited fax advertising.5 2 Although its
constitutionality has been challenged, the TCPA's fax provision
remains good law,53 and the prevalence of junk faxing has experienced
a dramatic decline. 4
increased the time telemarketers spent talking to a person from twenty minutes an
hour to fifty minutes. Id. Such technology operates by dialing numerous phone
numbers at once and ferreting out disconnected phone lines, faxes, and answering
machines. Id. When the system determines that it has made contact with a live
person, it transfers the call to a salesperson or disconnects the call if none is available.
Id. Predictive dialers angered telemarketing recipients and led to the do-not-call
registry. Id.
49. See Sorkin, supra note 7, at 1012 (describing the ease and economy of sending
bulk e-mail); see also supra note 48 (discussing the effectiveness of predictive dialers,
which enabled telemarketers to reach a larger audience than ever before).
50. Sorkin, supra note 7, at 1012.
51. Junk fax recipients must bear the costs of supplying paper and toner to
produce the fax. Id. at 1008-09. They are also inconvenienced insofar as they must
take time to identify and discard unwanted faxes, an inconvenience similar to that
presented by direct mail. Id. at 1011.
However, see infra notes 203-06 and
accompanying text for an explanation of why unsolicited commercial direct mail has
not been banned despite the inconvenience it poses to the recipient. Furthermore,
the unsolicited fax occupies the recipient's fax machine, barring the sending or receipt
of other faxes while the advertisement is being processed. Sorkin, supra note 7, at
1011.
52. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2000).
Outlining the scope of the ban, the statute defines unsolicited fax advertising:
The term 'unsolicited advertisement' means any material advertising the
commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which
is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or
permission....
It shall be unlawful for any person within the United
States... to use any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device
to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine ....
Id. § 227(a)(4), (b)(1)(C); see also Sorkin, supra note 7, at 1016-17 (discussing the
legislative history of the TCPA).
53. See Missouri v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 660 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding
that the TCPA fax provision satisfies the constitutional test for regulation of
commercial speech); Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54, 57 (9th Cir. 1995)
(holding that the TCPA fax provision was a valid content-based restriction on
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3. Spain
Unlike the current state of junk fax, the amount of spam is anything
but dwindling. Spam currently comprises sixty percent of all e-mail
traffic. 55 Estimates indicate that daily spain numbers twenty-five
million messages. 6 In fact, at least one commentator has argued that
if left unchecked, spam threatens to undermine the entire e-mail
communication system.
Reflecting this assertion, a recent poll has
indicated that spam is already causing twenty-five percent of
respondents to curtail their e-mail usage. 58 According to another poll,
eighty percent of e-mail users find spain "very annoying."59
Spam is often defined either as unsolicited commercial e-mail
("UCE") or unsolicited bulk e-mail ("UBE"). 6° The latter definition

commercial speech); Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1162, 1169 (S.D. Ind.
1997) (holding that the TCPA fax provision is narrowly tailored to the government's
interest in protecting consumers from cost-shifting and from interruption of their
ability to use their fax machines, and therefore did not violate the First Amendment's
protection of commercial speech).
54. Robert G. Gibbons & Lisa M. Ferri, Mail Control: FilteringSpam Through a
Mix of Technology, Legislation and the Courts, Intell. Prop. Today, Dec. 2001, at 6, 8.
55. Jonathan Krim, Senate Votes 97-0 to Restrict E-Mail Ads: Bill Could Lead to
No-Spare Registry, Wash. Post, Oct. 23, 2003, at Al.
56. Kenneth C. Amaditz, Canning "Spare" in Virginia: Model Legislation to
Control Junk E-mail, 4 Va. J.L. & Tech. 4, $ 3 (Spring 1999), at
http://www.vjolt.net/vol4/issue/homeart4.html.
Another estimate differed, stating
that in January 2003 alone, over six million distinct sparn attacks occurred. Cisneros,
supra note 18, 9 11. Regardless of which statistic better reflects the reality, it is clear
that the quantity of spain is sizeable.
57. See Amaditz, supra note 56, 91 19. There are a variety of sparn-related
consequences that may cause e-mail users to cease communicating via e-mail and
thereby destroy the medium's utility. Included in such consequences are system
delays, users' unwillingness to sift through an excessive number of messages, and
users' resort to deletion of e-mail from unknown addresses. Id.
58. Krim, supra note 55 (citing a poll released on October 22, 2003 by the Pew
Internet and American Life Project, a nonprofit research organization). A research
associate at the Telecommunications Research and Action Center--a nonprofit group
that supplemented the Pew study-discussed the curbing of e-mail usage as a
symptom of e-mail's potential obsolescence: "'The ever-increasing flood of spain is
causing consumers to turn away from e-mail as a means of communication .... Many
people we hear from are contemplating getting off the Internet altogether."' Katie
Hafner, A Change of Habits to Elude Spain's Pall,N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 2003, at G1.
59. Kennedy & Hatch, supra note 17, at 1221 (citing a Harris poll released in
January 2003).
60. David E. Sorkin, Technical and Legal Approaches to Unsolicited Electronic
Mail, 35 U.S.F. L. Rev. 325, 328 & n.11 (2001). The critical element of practically all
definitions of spam is that it is "unsolicited." Id. at 328.
An unsolicited
communication is one where the sender and recipient share no prior relationship, and
the recipient has not provided explicit consent to receive the communication. Id.
Alternatively, an unsolicited communication can be one where the recipient has
previously attempted to terminate the relationship, often by ordering the sender to
send no further communications. Id. at 328-29. Regarding UCE, a "commercial"
message is typically defined as one that "promotes the sale of goods or services." Id.
at 329-30.
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includes not only UCE but also the many forms of non-commercial
spam, including "charitable fundraising solicitations, opinion surveys,
religious messages, political advertisements, wartime propaganda,
virus hoaxes and other urban legends, chain letters, and hate e-mail."',

Despite this distinction, the greatest amount of UBE comes in the
form of commercial advertisements.62

Nevertheless, the distinction

proves to be important in the context of regulations on spain that
discriminate on the basis of subject matter.6 3

Spam has persisted for two reasons: it is highly inexpensive to send,
which, in turn, enables it to be cost-effective despite being an

otherwise ineffective method of direct marketing. 64 There is no permessage charge to send e-mail.6 5 As a result, a spammer's costs are

confined to equipment costs, a monthly rental fee for an e-mail
account, and the price of a mailing list. 66 As one commentator has
demonstrated, if a spammer can send an e-mail advertisement to one
61. Id. at 333 (citations omitted).
62. Id.
63. For a discussion of subject matter discrimination in the context of commercial
speech, see infra Part II.A. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)
(holding that an Illinois statute, which banned residential picketing other than
peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute, violated the
Equal Protection Clause because the statute discriminated against pickets on the basis
of the subject matter of their expression); Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,
94 (1972) (invalidating a Chicago ordinance prohibiting all picketing within 150 feet
of any primary or secondary school except peaceful picketing of a school involved in a
labor dispute). The Mosley Court explained:
The central problem with Chicago's ordinance is that it describes permissible
picketing in terms of its subject matter. Peaceful picketing on the subject of
a school's labor-management dispute is permitted, but all other peaceful
picketing is prohibited. The operative distinction is the message on a picket
sign. But, above all else, the First Amendment means that government has
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content.
Id. at 95. The federal district court ruling against the national do-not-call registry on
constitutional grounds is based on a theory of subject matter discrimination. See
Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1163 (D. Colo. 2003)
("[T]he FTC, by exempting charitable solicitors from the [national] do-not-call
registry, has imposed a content-based limitation on what the consumer may ban from
his home."), stay denied by 284 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (D. Colo. 2003), stay granted by 345
F.3d 850 (10th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004).
64. See Amaditz, supra note 56, T 18; Sorkin, supra note 60, at 337-38. Spam
persists because its uniquely affordable nature permits a disregard of factors that are
essential considerations in other forms of communication:
In most forms of communication, the sender experiences significant and,
usually, measurable costs. Therefore, the sender usually has an incentive to
compare the expected benefits of the communication against these costs in
deciding whether to proceed with the communication, and, in the case of an
advertisement, how broad or narrow a group of prospects to target. E-mail
changes the entire equation because the cost of sending unsolicited bulk email is negligible.
Id. at 338 (citations omitted).
65. Amaditz, supra note 56, 18.
66. Id.
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million people at a cost of only $100, he will make a profit even if just
one customer in 10,000 responds.67 He is indifferent to the annoyance
to the other 9999 recipients.68
Unlike telemarketing, which provides some clear economic
benefits, spam "has few redeeming features to balance [its] substantial
costs."'69 Though many objections to spam cite its content as the
problem, 7 it presents another significant-and legally relevantconcern: spam shifts measurable marketing costs to the middleman
and recipient. 7' Spam consumes network bandwidth, memory, and
storage space.72 Moreover, Internet users and system administrators
must take time to read, delete, filter, and block spam.73 On the
individual user level, the cost-shifting problem affects most directly
those Internet users who incur Internet access charges on the basis of
time spent online.74 These costs are hardly negligible; one recent
study assessed the annual cost of spain to U.S. corporations at $8.9
billion. 5
At least as far as the individual spam recipient is concerned, there is
little recourse to combat the spam problem. Recipients' requests to
the sender to opt out of unsolicited communications are uniquely
ineffective in the spain context because of the absence of incremental
costs.76
Moreover, there have been few spam-related lawsuits
involving individual recipients of spam since the first such suit was
brought in 1995.77 The lack of individual self-help remedies raises the
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Sorkin, supra note 60, at 337.
70. Id. at 336 (noting that some spain recipients object to commercial messages
altogether, while others are troubled by those messages containing sexually explicit
material or carrying virus-infected file attachments or embedded code).
71. See id. at 336-37.
72. Id. at 336.
73. Id. at 336-37.
74. See id. at 337 & n.49.
75. Kennedy & Hatch, supra note 17, at 1221 ("The figure was based on the time
it takes for recipients to detect and dispose of messages, as well as the cost to
companies of having to dedicate additional servers, bandwidth, and staff time to
accommodate unsolicited e-mail."). A 2001 study of the European Union put the
total cost to Internet users of spam worldwide at $9.4 billion. Gibbons & Ferri, supra
note 54, at 6.
76. Sorkin, supra note 60, at 352 (stating that the incremental costs of each
communication in the context of other modes of direct marketing- direct mail and
telemarketing -provide
marketers with sufficient incentive to honor opt-out
requests). Not only are opt-out requests not honored in the spain context, but some
spammers sell lists of e-mail addresses belonging to those people who have attempted
to opt out. Id. at 352-53. Furthermore, the enormous number of potential spammers
renders sender-specific opt-out attempts futile. Id. at 353.
77. Id. at 357-58 (discussing Arkow v. CompuServe, a case that was ultimately
settled out of court in which the plaintiff argued that the fax provision in the TCPA
was broad enough to include computers that send and receive e-mail); Gibbons &
Ferri, supra note 54, at 8 (stating that relatively few suits have been filed against
spammers by individual recipients, and only under recent state anti-sparn laws are
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question: What are state and federal governments doing to combat
the problems posed by spain, as well as by telemarketing and junk
faxing?
B. Statutory Regulation of Telemarketing, Spam, and Junk Fax
1. Governmental Interests
a. Consumer ProtectionAgainst Fraudand ProhibitingTrespass to
Chattel
There are various grounds posited to justify state regulation of
unsolicited communications, including (1) consumer protection
against fraud, (2) prohibiting trespass to chattel, (3) prevention of
cost-shifting, and (4) protection of residential privacy.78 With respect
to consumer protection against fraud, the Supreme Court has held
that government regulations of false and deceptive advertising do not
violate the First Amendment.79 Regarding trespass to chattel, some
courts have held spammers liable for overburdening the computers of
Internet service providers ("ISPs") and their customers, the spam
recipients.8" As if to preempt the suggestion that, by opening an eindividuals beginning to collect damage awards or negotiate settlements). One
commentator attributes the small number of individual actions to the relatively small
damages available and the difficulty for an individual to prove actual damages.
Sorkin, supra note 60, at 358 n.158. Internet service providers ("ISPs") typically find
themselves in a better position to demonstrate significant damages than do individual
sparn recipients. Id.
78. See Amaditz, supra note 56,
21-33.
79. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) ("Advertising
that is false, deceptive, or misleading of course is subject to restraint."); Va. State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976). The
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy Court stated:
Obviously, much commercial speech is not provably false, or even wholly
false, but only deceptive or misleading. We foresee no obstacle to a State's
dealing effectively with this problem. The First Amendment, as we construe
it today, does not prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of
commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Amaditz, supra note 56, 29 (arguing that because the
Supreme Court has permitted governmental regulation of false and deceptive
advertising, such regulation will likely be upheld).
80. See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc, v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022
(S.D. Ohio 1997) (holding that the defendant-spammer's e-mails occupied disk space
and drained the processing power of CompuServe's computers, thereby damaging the
value of that computer equipment to CompuServe); see also Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71
P.3d 296, 300-01 (Cal. 2003) (acknowledging a trespass-to-chattels-based remedy for
ISPs, but finding that such a theory is not satisfied by the facts of this case). One
commentator has suggested that this remedial theory is derived from a Supreme
Court decision, which held that if the Court did not uphold a federal law that
permitted an unwilling recipient to bar a direct mailer from filling his mailbox, it
would "tend to license a form of trespass." Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't,
397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970); Amaditz, supra note 56, 30 (citing Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737).
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mail account, an e-mail user willingly subjects himself to such
trespasses, the California Supreme Court has stated, "A private
actor... has no obligation to hear all messages just because he

chooses to hear some."81 While consumer protection against fraud
and trespass to chattel are reasonable interests, avoidance of costshifting and guarding of residential privacy are the governmental
interests of greatest significance and relevance to the inquiry of this
Note.82
b. Preventionof Cost-Shifting
As stated above, spain shifts advertising costs to e-mail users.83 But

that is not the only mode of unsolicited communication that imposes
costs on recipients. Recall that one of the primary reasons for passage
of the TCPA was the costs imposed on junk fax recipients.' These
costs take in the form of paper and toner to produce the fax
document, time needed to identify and discard unwanted faxes, and
temporary inability to send or receive faxes." In upholding the TCPA
fax provision, one federal appeals court cited such costs as the basis
for finding a substantial governmental interest in restricting
unsolicited fax advertisements.86 As one commentator emphasized
regarding the legitimacy of cost-shifting as a significant government
81. Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 316.
82. In light of the Supreme Court's acceptance of consumer protection against
fraud, see supra note 79 and accompanying text, there is little more to comment on on
that matter. Moreover, not all unsolicited solicitations involve fraudulent activity. As
for the relative insignificance of protection from trespass to chattel in this context, it is
owing to the infrequent application by courts and discussion by commentators of such
a concept. By way of contrast, cost-shifting and invasion of residential privacy
represent paramount concerns because they are well-established and oft-mentioned in
legal opinions, scholarly literature, and public discussion.
83. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. Note that telemarketing
appears not to entail any mentionable degree of cost-shifting. As implicit evidence of
this, the TCPA addressed what is arguably the one form of telephone call reception
that involves cost-shifting, aside from collect calls, in which case the recipient is
forewarned.
The TCPA banned any form of telemarketing that employs an
automatic dialing system or an automated or prerecorded voice where that
telemarketing is directed at a device for which the recipient gets charged to receive a
call, such as a cell phone. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2000).
85. Sorkin, supra note 7, at 1008-09, 1011.
86. Missouri v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 655 (8th Cir. 2003). The
American Blast Fax court noted the following regarding junk fax cost shifting:
There was evidence that unsolicited fax advertisements can shift to the
recipient more than one hundred dollars per year in direct costs, that it takes
thirty seconds for a one page fax to be received, that most machines can still
only receive one fax at a time, that currently eighty percent of all faxes are
printed on paper, and that unsolicited fax advertising interferes with
company switchboard operations and burdens the computer networks of
those recipients who route incoming faxes into their electronic mail systems.

2780

FORDHAM LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 72

interest, "[a federal appeals court] found that cost-shifting was an
interest sufficient enough to support an advertising
ban on an entire
's7
communications medium -the fax machine.
Recognizing that the fax machine shifts costs to recipients in a way
that makes the TCPA ban on junk fax compelling, one commentator
has argued that spain inflicts an even greater burden on recipients. 88
This is true despite the fact that the burden presented by an individual
spain e-mail is less than that imposed by an unsolicited fax.89 The
critical difference, argues the commentator, lies in the total number of
sparn e-mails that can be sent, as compared to the lesser number of
junk faxes to which a junk faxer is constrained. 90
Spamming shifts costs to some individual e-mail users, ISPs, and
employers generally.9' As mentioned above, one study placed the
total annual cost of spain to U.S. corporations at $8.9 billion.92 This
estimate was compiled based on the time it takes for e-mail users to
87. Amaditz, supra note 56, 22 (referring to the decision in Destination Ventures,
Ltd. v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995), in which the Ninth Circuit upheld the TCPA
fax provision).
88. Sorkin, supra note 7, at 1008.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1008, 1012 ("Unsolicited e-mail advertising is likely to be a burden to
computer users because of the sheer number of such messages that they receive,
rather than simply because of the cost or inconvenience involved in receiving and
deleting a single message."); see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
91. See Amaditz, supra note 56, $$ 11, 23; Sabra-Anne Kelin, State Regulation of
Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 435, 437 (2001). The e-mail
users affected are those whose subscription fee charges are based on time spent
online. Amaditz, supra note 56,
11, 23. They incur greater costs than they
otherwise would by taking time to identify and delete unwanted spain. Id. (stating
that some analysts estimate that spam consumes as much as $2 of such e-mailers'
average monthly fee). Amaditz concedes that it is more difficult to demonstrate costshifting to the individual user in situations where the user does not pay a flat monthly
fee or receives free e-mail. Id. 23. He submits that despite the inconveniences
imposed by spain, the fact that such fee arrangements prevent e-mail subscribers from
suffering any measurable cost-shifting might lead a court confronted by e-mailer
complainants with flat-fee or free subscriptions to find that such inconveniences are
reasonable burdens to bear for the sake of protecting First Amendment freedoms. Id.
Employers suffer the financial consequences of wasted employee time when an
individual undertakes the process of sorting, reading, and discarding spain, as well as
attempting to prevent future UCE while at work. Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 115
Cal. Rptr. 2d 258, 267 (Ct. App. 2002). Although these are not direct costs but only
opportunity costs, at least one judge has acknowledged that for companies, "'time is
money' nonetheless." Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 322 (Cal. 2003) (Brown, J.,
dissenting). Furthermore, one commentator has asserted that a reasonable argument
can be made that those e-mail users who pay flat monthly fees also suffer the burdens
of cost-shifting, as ISPs translate their own additional costs into higher monthly rates.
Amaditz, supra note 56, 23 n.120. Still, the commentator concludes that courts are
likely to afford the government little leeway in its efforts to protect such consumers.
Id.
92. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. The Ferris Research study, released
in January 2003, has received attention from respectable sources. For example, it is
included among the findings that serve as the basis for the California anti-spam law
passed recently. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529(d) (West Supp. 2004).
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identify and discard spam, along with the costs companies incur by
devoting additional servers, bandwidth, and employee time to deal
with spam.93 One state anti-spam statute helps to put spammers' costshifting in perspective, saying that it is similar to "sending junk mail
with postage due or making telemarketing calls to someone's pay-perminute cellular phone."9 4 Notably, the TCPA prohibits the latter.
c. Protectionof Residential Privacy
One of Congress's stated purposes in enacting the TCPA was "to
protect the privacy interests of residential telephone subscribers by
placing restrictions on unsolicited, automated telephone calls to the
home."96 Similarly, in establishing the national do-not-call registry,
the FTC asserted that it has a substantial interest in protecting
residential privacy. 97 The Supreme Court has routinely grounded
holdings in the fundamental aspect of the home as a refuge from
undesired communications.98 Although the extent to which a state can
93. Kennedy & Hatch, supra note 17, at 1221. An analyst at Ferris Research
explained the rough methodology of the study and cost-breakdown as follows: it
takes an average of 4.4 seconds to deal with a message, yielding a total cost of $4
billion dollars annually in lost productivity for U.S. businesses. Anick Jesdanun, Spam
Costs U.S. Firms About $8.9 Billion Annually, Study Says, AP Online (Jan. 5, 2003), at
http://news.spamcop.netlpipermail/spamcop-list/2003-January/029374.html.
Another
$3.7 billion is attributed to companies' need to purchase more powerful servers,
additional bandwidth, and divert employee time. Id. The final $1.2 billion is derived
from organizations' need to offer help-desk support to annoyed users. Id. Just as
claims of cost-shifting by flat-fee or free-subscription e-mail users may not prevail in
court, see supra note 91, some of these non-tangible factors, such as the costs a
company incurs by diverting staff time in order to deal with spam, may be rejected by
a court.
94. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529(h).
95. See supra note 84.
96. S. Rep. No. 102-178, at 1 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1968;
see also Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Inc. v. Telecomms. Premium Servs., Ltd., 975 F.
Supp. 329, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that the TCPA was enacted, in part, to protect
the privacy interests of residential telephone subscribers by restricting unsolicited
automated phone calls to the home).
97. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1164 (D. Colo.
2003), stay denied by 284 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (D. Colo. 2003), stay granted by 345 F.3d
850 (10th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004). The district court in this
case held that "[t]he FTC's asserted interest in protecting privacy in the home is
sufficiently substantial to justify a restriction in speech" so long as the do-not-call
registry satisfied the requirements for commercial speech restriction as defined by
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557
(1980). Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
98. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1988) (upholding a town
ordinance that banned picketing before or about any residence because such
picketing was held to be intrusive and therefore the ordinance was narrowly tailored
and constitutional); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (holding that the
FCC's determination that a profanity-laced George Carlin monologue broadcast over
radio in the middle of the afternoon merited a notation in the radio station's file did
not violate the station's First Amendment rights, in part because broadcasts extend
into the privacy of the home and it is impossible to completely avoid those that are
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protect residential privacy is not clear,99 protection of residential
privacy-including that threatened by telemarketing' 0 0-appears to
constitute a strong governmental interest.
In fact, the Supreme Court has said as much: "The State's interest
in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is
certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society."''
The
Court has specifically stated that "[o]ne important aspect 1of2
residential privacy is protection of the unwilling listener.,
Moreover, in a case involving a profanity-laced radio monologue
broadcast in the middle of the afternoon, the Supreme Court stated in
dicta a point that is particularly supportive of a governmental interest
in protecting privacy in the face of telemarketing:
To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio
when he hears indecent language is like saying that the remedy for
an assault is to run away after the first blow. One may hang up on
an indecent phone call, but that option does not give the caller a
constitutional immunity or avoid a harm that has already taken
place. 103
blatantly offensive). But see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (holding that
the state may not, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, criminalize the
public display of a jacket bearing an expletive, explaining that people are often
captive audiences outside their homes and subject to objectionable speech). The
Supreme Court has recognized that, in many cases, government may legislate to
prohibit intrusion of unwelcome views and ideas into residential privacy. Id.
99. Amaditz, supra note 56, 24.
100. It is arguably difficult to make a protection of privacy argument in the context
of spam or junk fax regulation. One commentator has suggested that "[i]n the spain
context, the privacy interest could support anti-spam legislation that protects
individuals" and that one Ninth Circuit case, Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir.
1995) (upholding the TCPA's ban on prerecorded or automated telemarketing calls to
residential phone lines), indicates that protection of residential privacy could support
a complete ban on spam. Amaditz, supra note 56, %28. The invasions of privacy
posed by spam and junk fax-including exposure to offensive material and identifying
and discarding unwanted communications-are akin to those presented by unsolicited
commercial direct mail, which the Supreme Court has held are reasonable burdens for
a recipient to endure under the Constitution. See infra notes 203-06 and
accompanying text (discussing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60
(1983)). It is conceivable that the temporary interference with a recipient's use of his
own fax machine caused by junk fax constitutes an invasion of privacy. However, the
costs shifted by junk fax are a more concrete and compelling factor on which to base a
need for regulation of the practice. Therefore, this Note focuses on protection of
residential privacy only as it applies to telemarketing. It will deal with cost-shifting as
the primary governmental interest implicated in spam and junk fax regulations.
101. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980).
102. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484.
103. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49.
The Court's holdings in two prominent
unsolicited advertising cases, Bolger, 463 U.S. at 75 (holding that a federal law, which
prohibited the unsolicited mailing of information concerning contraceptives was
unconstitutional under the First Amendment right to free speech), and Rowan v.
United States Post Office Department,397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (holding that a federal
law permitting individuals to require that direct mailers remove such individuals'
names from the mailers' mailing lists and refrain from all future mailings to those
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This language suggests that the governmental interest in protecting

residential privacy justifies legislation in the area of residencetargeted telemarketing.

Hanging up on telemarketers does not

sufficiently preserve the home as a refuge.
2. Government Regulation
a. State Statutes
Because there are already federal statutes in place that regulate email and junk fax, this section will only consider state statutes that
regulate spam.
In July 1997, Nevada became the first state to enact anti-spain

legislation.1" Currently, thirty-six states have sparn statutes.105 Most

state laws can be described as opt-out systems, permitting unsolicited
individuals was constitutional), will be discussed below. See infra notes 197-206 and
accompanying text.
104. Kelin, supra note 91, at 445.
105. See Alaska Stat. § 45.50.479 (Michie Supp. 2003); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 441372 to .05 (West Supp. 2003); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 4-88-601 to -607, 5-41-205 (Michie
Supp. 2003); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17529-.9, 17538.45 (West Supp. 2004); Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 6-2.5-101 to -105, 13-6-105, 13-6-403 (2003); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 5259(b), 53-451 to -453 (West 2001 & Supp. 2003); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 931, 937938 (2001); Idaho Code § 48-603E (Michie 2003); 720 II1.Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/16D-1 to
-3 (West 2003); 815 1I. Comp. Stat. Ann. 511/1 to /15 (West Supp. 2003); Ind. Code
Ann. § 24-5-22-1 to -10 (Michie Supp. 2003); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 714E.1-.2 (West
2003); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-6,107 (Supp. 2002); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:73.1, .6,
:106(A)(7) (West Supp. 2004); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1497 (West Supp. 2003);
Md. Code Ann., Com. Law II §§ 14-3001 to -3003 (Supp. 2002); Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. §§ 445.2501-.2508 (West Supp. 2003): Minn. Stat. Ann. § 325F.694 (West Supp.
2004); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 407.1120-.1132 (West 2001); Act of July 11, 2003, ch. 407, 2003
Mo. Legis. Serv. 710 (West); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 41.705-.735 (Michie 2002 & Supp.
2003); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 205.492, .498, .511, .513 (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2003);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-12-23 to -24 (Michie Supp. 2003); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-75.4. 1539.2A, 14-453, 14-458 (2003); N.D. Cent. Code § 51-27-01 to -09 (Supp. 2003); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.64 (Anderson Supp. 2002); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 776.1-.7
(West Supp. 2004); Act of Sept. 17, 2003, ch. 759, 2003 Or. Laws 1 (amending and
adding
provisions
to
Or.
Rev.
Stat.
§
646.607),
available at
http://www.leg.state.or.us/03orlaws/0759.pdf; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 5903, 7661
(West 2000 & Supp. 2003); 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 2250.1-.8 (West Supp. 2003);
R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-47-2 to -3 (2001); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-52-1 to -3, -4.1 to -7 (2002);
S.D. Codified Laws § 37-24-6, -36 to -40 (Michie 2003); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-182501 to -2502 (2001 & Supp. 2003); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 46.001-.011
(Vernon Supp. 2004); Utah Code Ann. § 13-36-101 to -105 (Supp. 2003); Va. Code
Ann. § 8.01-328.1 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003); Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-152.2, .3:1, .4,
.12, .16 (Michie Supp. 2003); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 19.190.010-.050 (West 1999 &
Supp. 2004); W. Va. Code Ann. § 46A-6G-1 to -5 (Michie 1999); Wis. Stat. Ann. §
944.25 (West Supp. 2003); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-12-401 to -404 (Michie 2003); see also
David E. Sorkin, Spam Laws, at http://www.spamlaws.com/state/index.html (last
modified
Dec.
16,
2003).
Professor
David
E.
Sorkin's
website,
http://www.spamlaws.com, provides a comprehensive discussion of spam laws in the
United States, European Union, and other countries. It includes a state-by-state
description of U.S. state spare laws.
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e-mail until the recipient requests that the spammer send no further
communications.0 6 In nearly all states, the bans that are involved
relate specifically to prohibitions of deceptive practices by commercial
spammers.107
Two states, however, have taken steps to eliminate spam altogether
by imposing bans on spam. Delaware was the first to do so in 1999,
making it a crime to send UCE.'0 However, only the attorney general
can enforce the Delaware law and, as yet, he has not sought to do
so.10 9 Recently, California went a step further, authorizing recipients
of spam, ISPs, and the state attorney general to bring an action for
violations of the statutory ban on UCE that travels within the state, or
crosses one of its borders.110 However, although the California law
took effect on January 1, 2004,111 it-as well as other state laws-faces
various challenges: legal, constitutional, and practical.
Legally speaking, the issue of federal legislative preemption has
proven problematic for laws like those in California and Delaware.
The CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, which President Bush signed into law
on December
16, 2003, makes explicit provision for preemption of all
12
laws.
state
From the constitutional standpoint, the dormant Commerce
Clause1 3 may also pose problems for state laws regardless of the
aggressiveness of their stance on spam, according to some
commentators." 4 But despite these arguments, in the last few years,
106. Saul Hansell, CaliforniaActs to Ban Junk E-Mail, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 2003,
at C1.
107. Id. Such prohibitions require commercial spain to be identified with the
phrase "ADV" in the subject line, indicating that the e-mail is an advertisement. Id.
108. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 937 ("A person is guilty of the computer crime of
unrequested or unauthorized electronic mail ... [w]hen that person, without
authorization, intentionally or recklessly distributes any unsolicited bulk commercial
electronic mail (commercial E-mail) to any receiving address or account under the
control of any authorized user of a computer system.")
109. Hansell, supra note 106.
110. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.2, .8 ("[A] recipient of an unsolicited
commercial e-mail advertisement transmitted in violation of this article, an electronic
mail service provider, or the Attorney General may bring an action against an entity
that violates any provision of this article .
111. Hansell, supra note 106.
112. For the preemption provision, see supra note 26.
113. The Commerce Clause states: "The Congress shall have Power... To
regulate Commerce .. . among the several States .... " U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
The Supreme Court has held that aside from the affirmative grant of authority to
Congress to regulate interstate commerce, the Commerce Clause also contains a
negative implication, which bars states from legislating in a manner that unduly
interferes with or discriminates against interstate commerce. Kelin, supra note 91, at
449-50; see, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997) ("The negative
or dormant implication of the Commerce Clause prohibits state taxation or regulation
that discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce and thereby
'imped[es] free private trade in the national marketplace."' (citations omitted)
(quoting Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 (1980))).
114. See, e.g., Kelin, supra note 91, at 445-46; Hansell, supra note 106 (noting
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one state appeals court and one state supreme court overturned lower
court rulings that invalidated state spain laws on dormant Commerce
Clause grounds.1 15 These cases reflect the notion that the dormant
Commerce Clause is violated only if state regulation "discriminates
against or unduly burdens""' 6 interstate commerce. Still, the current
state of the law is anything but clear on whether state regulation of
spam constitutes such discrimination or undue interference.
Finally, state regulation of spain entails certain practical problems.
Given that the Internet does not respect state borders, it is difficult to
regulate spammers through various non-uniform, location-based state
laws." 7 Even the less site-focused California law, which reaches
across state lines," 8 does not remedy the lack of uniformity among
state laws.' 19 Ultimately, this non-uniformity may present the greatest
frustration for state regulation of spam. 2 °
b. FederalStatutes
That federal laws have a greater potential for effective regulation of
unsolicited communications is evident from the decline in junk fax
following passage of the TCPA."' Enacted in 1991, the TCPA deals
both with junk fax and telemarketing. The TCPA bans junk faxing for
Professor David E. Sorkin's argument that the California spam statute could be
invalidated on dormant Commerce Clause grounds). Professor Sorkin has suggested
that the law could be struck down as an unconstitutional interference with interstate
commerce: "'Idon't think that states have much business regulating the Internet ....
If you can't tell where the recipient of an e-mail is, and still have to comply with
different state regulations, it is a burden on interstate commerce."' Id. There is also
the potential for due process problems with state spam statutes, insofar as states must
obtain personal jurisdiction over the spammer. Kelin, supra note 91, at 446 n.63
(citing generally Christopher S.W. Blake, Note, Destination Unknown: Does the
Internet's Lack of Physical Situs Preclude State and Federal Attempts to Regulate It?,
46 Clev. St. L. Rev. 129 (1998)),
115. See Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258, 268-69 (Ct. App.
2002) (holding that California's anti-spain law does not violate the dormant
Commerce Clause because the burdens it imposes on interstate commerce are
minimal); State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 413 (Wash. 2001) (holding that the
Washington law's benefits of limiting deceptive information contained in e-mail
subject lines and transmission paths outweighed any burdens placed on interstate
commerce).
116. Gen. Motors Corp., 519 U.S. at 287.
117. Cisneros, supra note 18, $ 12.
118. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.2 (West Supp. 2004). As such, the law may
be challenged by a dormant Commerce Clause or a due process argument. See supra
notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
119. Cisneros, supra note 18, %15.
120. This is so not only because it is impractical, but also because it may be
unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause or Due Process Clause. See
supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
121. Gibbons & Ferri, supra note 54, at 8. However, it must be conceded that this
success, in part, may be due to the object of the regulation rather than the regulator.
It is, after all, easier to identify the junk fax sender than the spammer.
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commercial purposes outright,122 a prohibition that has been upheld in
various federal court cases.'23 Regarding telemarketing, the TCPAamong other things12 4 -prohibits the placing of an unsolicited call to a
residential phone line using an artificial or prerecorded voice. 25
Although, this provision permits the FCC to exempt calls not made
for commercial purposes, 126 one federal
appeals court nevertheless
127
upheld the TCPA as content-neutral.
But the TCPA went beyond such specific regulations, broadly
128
authorizing the FCC to establish a national do-not-call registry.
Though the FCC did not take advantage of this authority, the FTC
established such a registry in December 2002 pursuant to authority
granted to it under the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud Abuse
and Prevention Act ("TCFAP"). 129 The TCFAP had ordered the FTC
122. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 53 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra notes 21116 and accompanying text.
124. For example, see supra note 84, which refers to the TCPA's ban on placing a
phone call using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded
voice to any telephone number assigned to a cellular phone.
125. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) (2000). The artificial or prerecorded voice provision
states:
It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States... to initiate
any telephone call to any residential telephone line using an artificial or
prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the prior express consent of
the called party, unless the call ... is exempted by rule or order by the
Commission under paragraph (2)(B).
Id. Regarding paragraph (2)(B) exemptions, see infra note 126 and accompanying
text.
126. Id. § 227(b)(2)(B)(i) ("In implementing the requirements of this subsection,
the Commission ... may, by rule or order, exempt from the requirements of [§
227(b)(1)(B)] ... calls that are not made for a commercial purpose .... ).
127. Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the TCPA's
artificial or prerecorded voice provision is content-neutral since nothing in the TCPA
requires the FCC to distinguish between commercial and non-commercial speech).
128. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(2)-(3). The FCC national do-not-call registry provision
states:
[T]he [Federal Communications] Commission... shall prescribe regulations
to implement methods and procedures for protecting the privacy rights
described in [§ 227(c)(1)]. ... The regulations required by [§ 227(c)(2)] may
require the establishment and operation of a single national database to
compile a list of telephone numbers of residential subscribers who object to
receiving telephone solicitations, and to make that compiled list and parts
thereof available for purchase.
Id.
129. Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 6101-6108 (West 1998 & Supp. 2003). The FTC established the national do-notcall registry by amending the Telemarketing Sales Rule ("TSR"). 16 C.F.R. pt. 310
(2003). There, the FTC defined the deceptive and abusive telemarketing acts or
practices it was authorized to prohibit under the TCFAP in part as placing a phone
call to a person who had put his name on the do-not-call list. Telemarketing Sales
Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4669, 4672 (Jan. 29, 2003) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310).
The FTC national do-not-call registry provision states:
It is an abusive telemarketing act or practice and a violation of this Rule for
a telemarketer to engage in, or for a seller to cause a telemarketer to engage
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to adopt rules prohibiting deceptive and abusive telemarketing acts or
practices.13 0 After a federal district court in Oklahoma questioned the
FrC's authority to establish the do-not-call registry, 3 ' the registry
went into effect on October 1, 2003,132 following an official mandate
from Congress
that the FTC does indeed have authority to establish
1 33
the registry.
Yet the troubles of the embattled do-not-call registry are far from
over. A separate federal district court-this time in Colorado-held
the registry, which exempts calls from charities, pollsters, and on
behalf of politicians,3
unconstitutional because it unjustifiably

discriminates against commercial speech on the basis of its subject

matter. 135 Only a few days later, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit stayed the Colorado district court's permanent
in, the following conduct:... Initiating any outbound telephone call to a
person when ... that person's telephone number is on the 'do-not-call'
registry, maintained by the [Federal Trade] Commission, of persons who do
not wish to receive outbound telephone calls to induce the purchase of goods
or services ...
Id. (emphasis added to highlight the registry's application to unsolicited commercial
speech only).
130. Regarding the adoption of such rules by the FTC, the TCFAP stated, "The
[Federal Trade] Commission shall prescribe rules prohibiting deceptive telemarketing
acts or practices and other abusive telemarketing acts or practices." 15 U.S.C.A. §
6102(a)(1). Elaborating, the TCFAP added, "The [Federal Trade] Commission shall
include in such rules respecting other abusive telemarketing acts or practices .. . a
requirement that telemarketers may not undertake a pattern of unsolicited telephone
calls which the reasonable consumer would consider coercive or abusive of such
consumer's right to privacy." Id. § 6102(a)(3)(A).
131. See U.S. Security v. FTC, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1290-91 (W.D. Okla. 2003)
(holding that Congress had only delegated authority to establish a national do-not-call
registry to the FCC-not to the FTC-by way of the TCPA).
132. See supra note 13.
133. See Act of Sept. 29, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-82, 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. (117 Stat.)
1006 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6102 note). This Act both gave the FTC authority
to establish a do-not-call registry, and ratified the do-not-call provision of the
telemarketing sales rule. The Act addressed these two points succinctly:
The Federal Trade Commission is authorized under section 3(a)(3)(A) of
the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act (15
U.S.C. 6102(a)(3)(A)) to implement and enforce a national do-not-call
registry.... The do-not-call registry provision of the Telemarketing Sales
Rule (16 C.F.R. 310.4(b)(1)(iii)), which was promulgated by the Federal
Trade Commission, effective March 31, 2003, is ratified.
Id.
134. The do-not-call registry only applies to "persons who do not wish to receive
outbound telephone calls to induce the purchase of goods or services." Telemarketing
Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4672; see also Stolberg & Richtel, supra note 4 ("[Tlhe
registry program still allows political and charitable solicitation calls to be made.").
135. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1168 (D. Colo.
2003) (holding that the registry burdens only one type of speech-commercial
speech-without a "privacy-based or prevention-of-abuse-based reason supporting
the disparate treatment of different categories of speech"), stay denied by 284 F.
Supp. 2d 1266 (D. Colo. 2003), stay granted by 345 F.3d 850 (10th Cir. 2003), rev'd,
358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004).
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injunction barring implementation of the do-not-call list, reasoning
that the FTC was likely to succeed on appeal in its contention that the
registry's distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech
satisfies the "reasonable fit" requirement of Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.'36 Pending the outcome
of that appeal, the Tenth Circuit permitted the FTC to enforce the
registry.'37
Over four months later, the Tenth Circuit held that the Constitution
permits the FTC to establish and enforce the do-not-call registry. 13 8
The court held that the registry conforms to Central Hudson's
government interest and reasonable fit requirements "because it
directly advances the government's important interests in
safeguarding personal privacy and reducing the danger of
telemarketing abuse without burdening an excessive amount of
'
speech."139
The court highlighted four features of the do-not-call
registry that sustain its constitutionality: (1) it restricts commercial
speech only; (2) it targets speech that invades residential privacy; (3) it
is an opt-out system; and (4) by curbing a sizeable portion of
unwanted calls, the registry furthers significantly the government's
interests in protecting consumers from abusive telemarketing and
invasions of residential privacy. 4 °

136. 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 345 F.3d at 860-61, staying
283 F. Supp. 2d at 1151, rev'd, 358 F.3d at 1228. The "reasonable fit" requirement as
stated by the Central Hudson Court entails an inquiry into "whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest." Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.,
447 U.S. at 566. Subsequently, the Supreme Court attempted an even more concise
statement of the "reasonable fit" test. See United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S.
418, 427-28 (1993) (quoting Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S.
328, 341 (1986)); infra note 177 and accompanying text. The Tenth Circuit explained
its reasoning in the MainstreamMarketing stay opinion:
We find it relevant that the national do-not-call list is of an opt-in nature,
which provides an element of private choice and thus weighs in favor of a
reasonable fit.... We also find it relevant that the FTC has not exempted
non-commercial speech totally from all regulation, as consumers are also
given some mechanism to block non-commercial solicitations by means of
company-specific objections to solicitations by charitable organizations.
Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 345 F.3d at 860 (citations omitted). As a point of
clarification regarding terminology, although the Tenth Circuit discusses the do-notcall registry's "opt-in nature" (emphasis added), this Note describes the same
characteristic as an "opt-out system." See supra text accompanying notes 27-28; supra
notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
137. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 345 F.3d at 861; Bloomberg News, CourtAllows
U.S. to Enforce No-Call Rule, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 2003, at C6 ("A federal appeals
court let the Federal Trade Commission enforce its do-not-call program against
telemarketers yesterday, while the agency appeals a judge's ruling that declared the
rule unconstitutional.").
138. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 358 F.3d at 1250-51.
139. Id. at 1233.
140. Id.
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Despite the Tenth Circuit decision, the legal saga of the national donot-call registry may not yet be complete. At the time of this writing,
an appeal to
telemarketing industry representatives are considering
1 41
the Tenth Circuit en banc or the Supreme Court.
While the do-not-call registry was tacking through the court system,
President Bush signed into law on December 16, 2003 a federal bill
142
proposing-among other things-a national do-not-spam registry.
On October 22, 2003, the Senate passed without opposition the CANSPAM Act of 2003, the nation's first federal anti-spain legislation. 43
On November 21, 2003, the House of Representatives
overwhelmingly approved the Act. 44 This federal law is notably less
aggressive than the California law because it does not give spain
recipients a private right of action.1 45 Another difference is that unlike
the California law, which bans all unsolicited commercial e-mail, 4 6 the
federal law regulates fraudulent or deceptive messages only. 47 These
distinctions are all the more noteworthy considering that the federal
anti-spain law specifically provides for preemption of tougher state
bills like California'sS. 14 The relative impotence of the federal antistate laws
spam law-which, to add insult to injury, supplants tougher
49
like California's-has some commentators concerned.1
141. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
142. See CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, § 9, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(117 Stat.) 2699, 2716 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7708) ("[T]he [Federal Trade]
Commission shall transmit... a report that.., sets forth a plan and timetable for
The Commission
establishing a nationwide marketing Do-Not-E-Mail registry ....
may establish and implement the plan .... ). Though the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003
was sponsored by Senators Conrad Burns (R-MT) and Ron Wyden (D-OR), the donot-spam registry was conceived by Senator Charles E. Schumer (D-NY). Krim, supra
note 55. Schumer had proposed a do-not-sparn registry in his own bill, the SPAM
Act, introduced in the Senate on June 11, 2003. See id.; see also Stop Pornography and
Abusive Marketing Act, S. 1231, 108th Cong. (2003).
143. The Senate approved the bill by a vote of ninety-seven to zero, with three
Senators not voting. 149 Cong. Rec. S13,044 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 2003); see also Krim,
supra note 55.
144. The House of Representatives passed the bill by a vote of 392 to five, with
thirty-seven Representatives not voting. 149 Cong. Rec. H12,297 (daily ed. Nov. 21,
2003).
145. Enforcement powers are only granted to the FTC, ISPs, and attorneys general,
agencies, or officials of the state. CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 § 7, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(117 Stat.) at 2711-15 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7706). Regarding the spam
recipient's right of action under the California law, see supra note 110 and
accompanying text.
146. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.2 (West Supp. 2004).
147. See CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 § 4, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. (117 Stat.) at 2703-06 (to
be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7703 and 18 U.S.C. § 1037); see also David Firestone & Saul
Hansell, Senate Votes to Crack Down on Some Spam, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 2003, at
C1.
148. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
149. One commentator has noted that the federal bill does nothing to address the
problem of so-called "white collar spam," spam that is sent by large, established
companies. Saul Hansell, It Isn't Just the Peddlers of Pills: Big Companies Add to
Spam Flow, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 2003, at Al. Additionally, FTC chairman Timothy
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II. SUBJECT MATTER DISCRIMINATION AND BANS ON UNSOLICITED
SOLICITATIONS: ARE FEDERAL COURTS DEFYING SUPREME COURT
JURISPRUDENCE?

First recognized as deserving of First Amendment privileges in
1976,150 commercial speech-usually defined as speech proposing a
commercial or financial transaction 5 ' -currently enjoys a high degree
of constitutional protection.'52 The Supreme Court has even rendered
an opinion that suggests it is likely to invalidate a ban on unsolicited
solicitations, whether in whole or only as applied to commercial
speech.'53 It is therefore notable that federal courts have, on three
occasions, upheld the TCPA despite its outright ban on unsolicited fax
advertising.'
Moreover, these rulings, and the recent Tenth Circuit
decision declaring the national do-not-call registry constitutional' 55 do
not seem to square with the Supreme Court's prohibition of subject
matter discrimination.'56 The background to this last problem will be
addressed first.
A. Subject Matter Discriminationas It Pertainsto CommercialSpeech
In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, the Supreme Court
invalidated a Chicago ordinance prohibiting all picketing within 150
feet of any primary or secondary school except peaceful picketing of a
school involved in a labor dispute.1 57 The Court explained that "above
Muris has suggested that spammers are no more likely to comply with a national donot-spam registry than with the state anti-spam laws they currently ignore. Firestone
& Hansell, supra note 147.
150. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 770 (1976). For a discussion of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, see infra
notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
151. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562
(1980) (defining commercial speech as "speech proposing a commercial transaction");
Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1160 (D. Colo. 2003)
("Commercial speech is defined as speech that proposes a financial transaction.").
152. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). For a
discussion of 44 Liquormart,see infra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
153. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72-75 (1983).
154. See Missouri v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003); Destination
Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995); Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F.
Supp. 1162 (S.D. Ind. 1997). For a statutory definition of the phrase "unsolicited
advertisement," see supranote 52.
155. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 2004).
For a discussion of the decision, see supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
157. Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94 (1972). Prior to Mosley, Justice
Black had articulated a similar notion while writing in concurrence in Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black stated:
[B]y specifically permitting picketing for the publication of labor union
views, Louisiana is attempting to pick and choose among the views it is
willing to have discussed on its streets. It thus is trying to prescribe by law
what matters of public interest people whom it allows to assemble on its
streets may and may not discuss. This seems to me to be censorship in a
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all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
or its content."'58 Later, in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., the
Court clarified its position-albeit in dicta-on content-based
restrictions as they apply to commercial speech, stating that unlike
non-commercial speech, where such restrictions are permitted only
under the most extraordinary circumstances, "content-based
restrictions on commercial speech may be permissible."' 59 The Court
explained its relative leniency on account of the "greater potential for
deception or confusion in the context of certain advertising
messages."' 6 °
Nevertheless, the Court continues to make inquiries into the
existence of content-based discrimination in the context of
In City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
commercial speech restrictions.'
Network, Inc., for example, the Court struck down a city ban on the
distribution of commercial handbills via newsracks, in part because
the regulation was not content neutral. 62 Predictably, lower courts
have taken heed of this trend. In Moser v. FCC, the Ninth Circuit
upheld the TCPA's ban on prerecorded or automated telemarketing
calls to residential phone lines, in part because the statute merely
allowed-but did not require-the FCC to distinguish between

most odious form, unconstitutional
Amendments.

under the First and Fourteenth

Id.
158. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95. The Court later reemphasized that Mosley referred to
any form of content-based discrimination, whether based on the speaker's viewpoint
or the subject matter of his speech: "The First Amendment's hostility to contentbased regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to
prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic." Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980). Mosley exemplifies a case of
subject matter discrimination. The same year as Consolidated Edison, the Court
invalidated another state regulation on subject matter discrimination grounds. See
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (holding that an Illinois statute, which
banned residential picketing other than peaceful picketing of a place of employment
involved in a labor dispute, violated the Equal Protection Clause because the statute
discriminated against pickets on the basis of the subject matter of their expression).
159. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983).
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994)
(characterizing the federal cable system must-carry rules as content-neutral because
the benefits they confer and burdens they impose are made without reference to the
content of speech). Turner Broadcastingnoted, "Our precedents thus apply the most
exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential
burdens upon speech because of its content." Id. at 642.
162. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429-30 (1993).
The Court explained its finding regarding the lack of content neutrality: "Under the
city's newsrack policy, whether any particular newsrack falls within the ban is
determined by the content of the publication resting inside that newsrack. Thus, by
any commonsense understanding of the term, the ban in this case is 'content based."'
Id. at 429.
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That ban's
commercial and non-commercial phone calls. 163
permissiveness is less problematic than the obligatory ban on
commercial speech only under the TCPA fax provision. 164 But the
TCPA is not the only federal statute enduring judicial scrutiny in this
area; the federal courts have been wrestling with the possibility that
the national do-not-call registry discriminates against commercial

speech on the basis of subject matter. 165 Apparently, despite Bolger's
early acceptance in dicta of subject matter discrimination as applied to

commercial speech, 166 the Supreme Court and federal courts have-in
recent years-remained wary of permitting content-based regulations
of commercial speech. The reason for this can be found in an
appreciation of the heightened protection that commercial speech
currently enjoys, as compared to the more subordinate position it
once occupied on the spectrum of protected speech.
1. Near-Strict Scrutiny Protects Commercial Speech from Subject
Matter Discrimination

Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.1 67 gave birth to constitutional protection of commercial

speech. There, the Court invalidated a Virginia law that-purely to
maintain the integrity of the pharmacy profession-provided that a
pharmacist was guilty of unprofessional conduct if he advertised a
price for prescription drugs. 168 The Court reasoned that, as a matter
of public interest, individuals' private economic decisions ought to be
well-informed. 6 9 It concluded, therefore, that "the free flow of

commercial information is indispensable."' 7 °

163. Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1995). For further discussion of this
TCPA provision, see supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
165. See Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1168 (D.
Colo. 2003) (holding that the registry burdens only one type of speech-commercial
speech-without a "privacy-based or prevention-of-abuse-based reason supporting
the disparate treatment of different categories of speech"), stay denied by 284 F.
Supp. 2d 1266 (D. Colo. 2003), stay granted by 345 F.3d 850, 860 (10th Cir. 2003)
(staying that district court's permanent injunction barring implementation of the donot-call list, reasoning that the FTC is likely to succeed on appeal in its contention
that the registry's distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech
satisfies the reasonable fit requirement of Central Hudson), rev'd, 358 F.3d 1228,
1238-39 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding the registry constitutional in part because it satisfies
the reasonable fit requirement of Central Hudson, explaining that "[t]he
underinclusiveness of a commercial speech regulation is relevant only if it renders the
regulatory framework so irrational that it fails materially to advance the aims that it
was purportedly designed to further").
166. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
167. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976).
168. Id. at 749-51, 773.
169. Id. at 765.
170. Id.
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Having established in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy that
commercial speech was, in fact, protected by the First Amendment,
the Supreme Court proceeded, in Central Hudson, to define the
parameters of that protection. There, it invalidated a regulation
promulgated by the Public Service Commission of New York, which
prohibited all advertising by electric utility companies doing business
in the state. 172 In doing so, the Court adopted a four-part test for
permissible commercial speech regulation. 173 The inquiries include:
(1) whether the speech is protected by the First Amendment; 174 (2)
whether the government's asserted interest in regulating the speech is
substantial; (3) whether the regulation directly promotes the interest
that the government claims to have; and (4) whether the regulation is
broader than necessary to promote the government interest. 75 The
Court held that the regulation failed to satisfy the fourth prong and
was therefore unconstitutional.7 6 In subsequent decisions, the Court
has occasionally considered the third and fourth prongs jointly as a
"reasonable fit" test, 77 which thereby renders the Central Hudson
analysis a three-pronged endeavor.
171. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-66
(1980).
172. Id. at 571-72. The rule was originally ordered in response to the energy
shortage during the winter of 1973-74. Id. at 559. Three years later, after the shortage
had abated but with a mind towards continued conservation of energy, the
Commission sought public comment on whether to continue the ban. Id. Despite the
First Amendment-based protests of Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp., the
Commission renewed the ban. Id.
173. Id. at 566.
174. For commercial speech to be protected by the First Amendment, it at least
must relate to lawful activity and not be misleading. Id.
175. Id.
176. Regarding factor (1), the Court ruled that the electric companies' advertising
was commercial speech that was protected by the First Amendment, since the
Commission did not claim that the advertising was inaccurate or that it related to
unlawful activity. Id. at 566-67. Regarding factor (2), the Court held that the asserted
government interests of energy conservation and energy rate fairness were
substantial. Id. at 568-69. Regarding factor (3), the Court decided that although there
was a direct link between the government interest in energy conservation and the
Commission's regulation, the link between the government's interest in energy rate
fairness and Central Hudson's rate structure was tenuous at best. Id. at 569.
Regarding factor (4), the Court concluded that the regulation was overbroad because
it applied to advertising of electric devices or services whose usage would cause no
increase in the total energy use. Id. at 569-70.
177. See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 427-28 (1993) ("As
we have said, '[tihe last two steps of the Central Hudson analysis basically involve a
consideration of the 'fit' between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to
accomplish those ends"' (alteration in original) (quoting Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v.
Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986))). Lower courts have at times followed
suit. See, e.g., Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1162, 1167 (S.D. Ind. 1997)
("The Supreme Court has since explained the final two prongs of the Central Hudson
test as requiring that there be a "reasonable fit' between the legislature's ends and the
means chosen to accomplish those ends."' (quoting Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y.
v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989))). However, some decisions of the Court continue to
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The Central Hudson test has been described as an "intermediate
standard of review. ' 178 Yet despite the label, some Supreme Court
decisions subsequent to Central Hudson have seemingly cast the
commercial speech analysis in a light far closer to-albeit not quite-a
strict scrutiny standard.179 In elaborating on the third prong of the
four-part Central Hudson test, the Court has been particularly
demanding of government justification: "This burden is not satisfied
by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental body
seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction
will in fact alleviate them to a material degree." 180 Such rigorous
demands have occasionally translated into invalidations of
government regulations. For example, in Edenfield v. Fane, the Court
struck down a Florida Board of Accountancy rule barring accountants
from engaging in personal solicitation of clients on the grounds that
the Board had presented no studies suggesting that personal
enunciate a four-part test. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 55556 (2001). In such decisions, the third inquiry is whether the government has
demonstrated that the harms it asserts are real and that the regulation it imposes will
actually alleviate the harm to a material degree. Id. at 555. The fourth inquiry is
whether there exists "a reasonable 'fit between the legislature's ends and the means
chosen to accomplish those ends,... a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective."' Id. at 556 (quoting Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 632 (1995),
which quoted Fox, 492 U.S. at 480) (internal quotation marks omitted). This does
not, however, involve a consideration of whether the government employs the least
restrictive means. Id.
178. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993).
179. Admittedly, the Court's elaboration on the fourth prong and its application to
various commercial speech cases reflects a relatively surmountable requirement. The
Court has emphasized that the fourth prong demands "a fit that is not necessarily
perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but
one whose scope is 'in proportion to the interest served,' that employs not necessarily
the least restrictive means but ...a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective." Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 (citation omitted) (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191,
203 (1982)). Moreover, the Court has stated that the history of the fourth prong
suggests that it is somewhat easily satisfied:
None of our cases invalidating the regulation of commercial speech involved
a provision that went only marginally beyond what would adequately have
served the governmental interest. To the contrary, almost all of the
restrictions disallowed under Central Hudson's fourth prong have been
substantially excessive, disregarding 'far less restrictive and more precise
means.'
Id. at 479 (quoting Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988)). Nevertheless,
some of the Court's cases, including Central Hudson itself, have held that the fourth
prong has not been met. This, together with the Court's strict interpretation of the
third prong, amount to what occasionally has been perceived as a rigorous form of
intermediate scrutiny, as in 44 Liquormart. See infra notes 185-89 and accompanying
text. Even the dicta of CentralHudson takes a strong approach against blanket bans
on commercial speech: "[I]n recent years this Court has not approved a blanket ban
on commercial speech unless the expression itself was flawed in some way, either
because it was deceptive or related to unlawful activity." Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp., 447 U.S. at 566 n.9.
180. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-71.
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solicitation of prospective clients created the asserted dangers of
fraud, overreaching, or compromised independence.'
Laws have also failed to satisfy the "reasonable fit" test and the
fourth

prong.

In

Discovery Network, the

Court

declared

unconstitutional a Cincinnati ban on the distribution of commercial
handbills via newsracks, holding that the ban did not establish a
reasonable fit between the city's stated interest in promoting safety
and aesthetics through a reduction of newsracks and its selective

prohibition of commercial newsracks, because commercial newsracks
amounted to only a small number of the total newsracks in the city.'82
Similarly, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., the Court invalidated a
federal act that prohibited beer labels from displaying alcohol content

with the aim of preventing brewers from competing on the basis of
alcohol strength.18 3 In doing so, the Court noted the availability of less

intrusive alternatives, such as directly limiting the alcohol content of
beers.'84

181. Id. at 763-64, 771; see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 66768 (1994) (remanding for a determination of whether the government has shown that
the economic well-being of local television stations was in real danger, such that they
were in need of the protections afforded to them by the must-carry provisions of a
federal cable television act, which required cable television systems to devote a
portion of their channels to transmission of local television stations). Turner
Broadcasting stated, "When the Government defends a regulation on speech as a
means to redress past harms or prevent anticipated harms, it must do more than
simply 'posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured."' Id. at 664 (quoting
Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). The Turner
Broadcasting Court then proceeded to cite the Edenfield rule. Id. For the Edenfield
rule, see supra note 180 and accompanying text.
182. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 412-13, 417 (1993).
Since the ban failed Central Hudson, the Court explicitly did not "reach the question
whether, given certain facts and under certain circumstances, a community might be
able to justify differential treatment of commercial and noncommercial newsracks."
Id. at 428. But see Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507-12, 519
(1981) (striking down as facially invalid a city ordinance that banned all billboards
except commercial billboards on business premises despite the fact that the ordinance
satisfied the requirements of Central Hudson because "San Diego has chosen to favor
certain kinds of messages-such as onsite commercial advertising, and temporary
political campaign advertisements-over others").
183. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 478, 485,491 (1995).
184. Id. at 490-91. The Court also based the invalidation on the government's
failure to satisfy the third prong of Central Hudson, maintaining that other sections of
the same federal law-such as the allowance of alcohol content displays on wine and
spirits labels-frustrate the government's asserted purpose in a way that will prevent
this section of the law from materially advancing it. Id. at 488-90; see also Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 534-36, 566-67 (2001) (holding that Massachusetts
regulations governing advertising and sale of cigarettes, cigars, and smokeless tobacco
with the governmental intent of preventing underage smoking did not satisfy Central
Hudson's third or fourth prongs). In Lorillard, a regulation prohibiting outdoor
smokeless tobacco and cigar advertising within 1000 feet of a school or playground
was held to materially advance the government's interest, but also to be overly broad,
as it had the practical effect of banning nearly all such outdoor advertising in major
Massachusetts cities. Id. at 556, 561-63, 566. As a result, the regulation would affect
not only underage smokers, but also adults. Id. at 562. Another regulation barring
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Perhaps the strongest evidence in support of this near-strict-scrutiny
interpretation is the Court's holding in 44 Liquormart,Inc. v. Rhode
Island.'8 5 This declaratory judgment action involved two Rhode
Island laws that banned alcohol price advertising so as to promote the
state interest of reducing alcohol consumption. 186 The Court held that
the law violated the First Amendment because the state failed to
satisfy the "heavy burden of justifying [a] complete ban. '187 More
skeptically, Justice Stevens noted for the plurality that "blanket
prohibition[s] against truthful, nonmisleading speech... rarely survive
'
constitutional review."188
The Court's position in 44 Liquormart-as
well as in the previously discussed cases -has led some commentators
to argue that the intermediate
scrutiny standard has more "teeth"
189
than once was assumed.
The Central Hudson-with-teeth interpretation is squarely in accord

with the Court's apparent abandonment of Bolger's dicta that in
regulating commercial speech, a government can exercise subject

matter discrimination. 19° As commercial speech has attained a higher
level of protection since the Bolger decision, the Court is almost as

unlikely to condone instances of subject matter discrimination in the
commercial speech context as in the non-commercial speech arena.

smokeless tobacco and cigar advertising from being placed below five feet from the
floor in retail establishments within 1000 feet of a school or playground was held not
to materially advance the government's interest because some children are taller than
five feet and those who are not can look up to view advertising above five feet. Id. at
566. Moreover, the Court held that the height provision did not constitute a
reasonable fit with the government's goal, since it was not narrowly tailored. Id. at
567.
185. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996).
186. Id. at 489-90, 504.
187. Id. at 516.
188. Id. at 504 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). Justice Stevens was joined in that
plurality opinion by Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg. Id. at 488. Additionally,
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg took an even more strong-handed position,
suggesting that a ban on truthful, non-misleading commercial speech for reasons
unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process should be held to the same
strict scrutiny standard that the First Amendment usually requires. Id. at 501
(Stevens, J., plurality opinion). Concededly, the Court has, at times, reaffirmed that
Central Hudson's intermediate scrutiny standard is the applicable standard in cases of
commercial speech regulation. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S.
357, 367-68 (2002) ("Although several Members of the Court have expressed doubts
about the Central Hudson analysis and whether it should apply in particular cases,
there is no need in this case to break new ground." (citations omitted)). The critical
point, however, has been noted by one commentator: "[T]he Court's lack of
consistency in this area reinforces the argument that intermediate scrutiny is utterly
untethered and capable of substantial manipulation." Christina E. Wells, Beyond
Campaign Finance: The First Amendment Implications of Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC, 66 Mo. L. Rev. 141,164 (2001).
189. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 188, at 164 & n.148.
190. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
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Evidently, commercial speech has entered the fold of protection from
subject matter discrimination created by Mosley. 9 '
2. Bans on All Unsolicited Solicitation Do Not Constitute Subject

Matter Discrimination
Though the Court has given increasing deference to commercial
speech in the context of subject matter discrimination, it has refused
to view bans on all solicitation-i.e., all unsolicited requests for

money, whether for products or services, political causes, or
charities-as content-based. In United States v. Kokinda, the Court
upheld a federal statute prohibiting solicitation on post office

premises, in part because a four-justice plurality held that such a
regulation was content neutral."" This holding came despite the
protests of dissenting Justice Brennan, joined by three other Justices,
who argued that the regulation was indeed content-based since "a

person on postal premises [who] says to members of the public,
'Please support my political advocacy group,' ... cannot be punished"
but one who says, "'Please contribute $10,'... is subject to criminal
prosecution.' '193 With the departure of Justices Brennan and Marshall
from the Court, and the arrival of Justice Thomas, the plurality in
Kokinda grew to a majority in International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, which upheld a Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey regulation prohibiting the repetitive solicitation
of money within airport terminals operated by that body. 194 The
majority held that the prohibition on solicitation satisfied a standard
of reasonableness, 195 thereby eliminating the need for this Note to
evaluate the constitutionality of scenarios like that described by
Justice Brennan in Kokinda.196
191. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
192. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 736 (1990) (O'Connor, J., plurality
opinion). Justice O'Connor announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered the
plurality opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Scalia
joined. Id. at 722.
193. Id. at 753 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's dissent was joined by
Justices Marshall, Stevens and Blackmun (Justice Blackmun only joined with regard
to the subject matter discrimination argument). Id. at 740. Had Justice Brennan
persuaded a majority of the Court of his reasoning that statutes that ban unsolicited
solicitations but not unsolicited non-monetary requests-such as a request to vote for
a particular political candidate, or to join a friend in a poker game-are not contentneutral, this Note might have explored an additional two categories of unsolicited
communication regulation. But because a majority of the Court resolved the matter
definitively in InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S.
672, 683 (1992), there is no need to examine such scenarios in this Note.
194. Lee, 505 U.S. at 675-76, 685. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of
the Court, in which Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined. The
Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Leading Cases, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 163, 280 & n.949

(1992).
195. Lee, 505 U.S. at 683.
196. But see id. at 678 ("Where the government is acting as a proprietor, managing
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B. Bans Versus Opt-Outs of All Unsolicited Solicitations
Although bans on all unsolicited solicitations have not been
invalidated by the Court on account of subject matter discrimination,
such bans may be viewed in light of other Supreme Court precedent,
which appears to favor opt-outs of all unsolicited solicitations, but
disfavors banning those solicitations.
1. Bans Versus Opt-Outs in the Area of Direct Mail Regulation
The Supreme Court itself seems at first glance to have espoused
contradictory views regarding unsolicited commercial speech
regulation, although further consideration may demonstrate
otherwise. In fact, the Court simply may have been opposed to
bans-as distinct from opt-out systems-in the area of direct mail
regulation.
In Rowan v. United States Post Office Department,the Court upheld
a federal law permitting an individual to require a direct mailer to
remove his name from the sender's mailing list, and to refrain from all
future mailings.'97 The Court explained that "a mailer's right to
communicate must stop at the mailbox of an unreceptive
addressee."' 98 It added, "[t]o hold less would tend to license a form of
trespass." 199 This holding seems perfectly in accord with the judiciallyacknowledged governmental interest in the preservation of privacy
within the home.2"°
However, the Court followed that opinion with a holding in
Bolger20 1 that seems more akin to the Court decisions concerning
annoyance outside the home-where the Court does not countenance
privacy interests 2"-than it does with Supreme Court residential
its internal operations, rather than acting as lawmaker with the power to regulate or
license, its action will not be subjected to the heightened review to which its actions as
a lawmaker may be subject."). This statement by the Lee Court may leave room to
argue that in situations where the government is not acting as proprietor but rather, as
lawmaker, such as when it bans unsolicited solicitations but not unsolicited nonmonetary requests, a heightened standard of review will apply and the existence of
subject matter discrimination may invalidate the law. This interpretation certainly is
supported by the discussion above, which maintains that, despite the dicta in Bolger,
see supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text, the Court scrutinizes regulations on
commercial speech that discriminate on the basis of subject matter almost as closely
as it does those on non-commercial speech. See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying
text. Nevertheless, the constitutionality of scenarios like that described by Justice
Brennan in Kokinda will be considered settled for the purposes of this Note.
197. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 729, 740 (1970).
198. Id. at 736-37.
199. Id. at 737.
200. See supra Part I.B.l.c.
201. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
202. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414, 416 (1989) (holding that the First
Amendment protected a man who burned an American flag during a protest rally
since a fundamental principle underlying the First Amendment is that the government
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privacy jurisprudence. Bolger involved a federal law that prohibited
the mailing of unsolicited contraceptive advertisements.2 13 The Court
dismissed one of the government's asserted interests-shielding mail
recipients from offensive material 2 4-by explaining that "[r]ecipients
of objectionable mailings... may 'effectively avoid further
bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes. '20
The Court added that "the 'short, though regular, journey from mail
box to trash can... is an acceptable burden, at least so far as the
Constitution is concerned. ' ' 2 6 At least so far as the facts in Bolger are
concerned, commercial speech trumps residential privacy.
At first glance, Rowan and Bolger appear somewhat contradictory:
Rowan is protective of residential privacy while Bolger is not. Yet one
commentator has attempted to reconcile these cases by suggesting
that it is the nature of the regulation, rather than the governmental
interest, that is dispositive. 2°17 According to this theory, the Court will
uphold a government regulation that allows private individuals to take
affirmative steps to prevent unsolicited solicitations from entering the
home-i.e., an opt-out system-but will strike down measures
whereby
the government
itself prevents marketers from
may not prohibit expression simply because the public believes that expression to be
offensive or disagreeable); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701-02
(1977) (holding a New York statute that banned contraceptive advertising
unconstitutional, explaining that the mere fact that protected speech may be offensive
to some individuals does not justify its suppression); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205, 206-07, 209, 217-18 (1975) (invalidating a city ordinance prohibiting the
display of nudity by a drive-in movie theater where the screen is visible from a public
street or place, reasoning that selective shielding of speech by the government on the
grounds that it is more offensive than other types of speech has been upheld only
when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home, or where the extent of the
audience's captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer to avoid exposure);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21, 26 (1971) (holding that the state may not, under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, criminalize the public display of a jacket
bearing an expletive, explaining that the Court has repeatedly stressed that people are
often captive audiences outside their homes and subject to objectionable speech).
Further demonstrating the analogy between Bolger and the annoyance cases, the
language in Cohen, which was initially adopted by Erznoznik, was later appropriated
by Bolger: "[Viewers] could effectively avoid further bombardment of their
sensibilities simply by averting their eyes." Id. at 21; see infra note 205 and
accompanying text.
203. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 61.
204. Id. at 71. The Court stressed that the critical issue in determining whether
speech directed at the home is intrusive concerns whether the listener is a "captive"
audience: "The First Amendment 'does not permit the government to prohibit
speech as intrusive unless the captive audience cannot avoid objectionable speech."'
Id. at 72 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 530, 542 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
205. Id. at 72 (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21) (citation omitted).
206. Id. (quoting Lamont v. Comm'r of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880, 883
(S.D.N.Y. 1967)).
207. Amaditz, supra note 56, T 27 (citing Michael W. Carroll, Garbage In:
Emerging Media and Regulation of Unsolicited Commercial Solicitations, 11 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 233, 243-44 (1996)).
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communicating-i.e., a ban."' If this conclusion is correct, federal
court rulings upholding the TCPA junk fax provision stand poised for
reversal should the Supreme Court ever agree to address the issue,
that is, unless junk fax is somehow distinguishable from direct mail.
2. Federal Court Rulings on the TCPA's Fax Provision
Given the Central Hudson-with-teeth interpretation of commercial
speech regulation analysis 2 9 and Bolger's apparent disapproval of

bans on commercial speech,210 it is difficult to comprehend the various

federal court rulings on the TCPA's unsolicited fax ban.211 In
Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, the Ninth Circuit upheld the TCPA
fax provision reasoning that there was a "reasonable fit" between the
congressional goal of reducing cost-shifting and the fact that

unsolicited commercial faxes are responsible for the vast majority of

junk fax cost-shifting.2 12 Likewise, in Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., a
federal district court held that the TCPA junk fax ban is constitutional
because it directly advances Congress's asserted interests in guarding
consumers from interference with the usage of their own fax machines
and from cost-shifting.2 13 Furthermore, the Kenro court found the ban
narrowly tailored to those interests.214 More recently, the Eighth
Circuit in Missouri v. American Blast Fax, Inc. reversed a district court
ruling striking down the fax provision. 21 5 The Eighth Circuit held that

the government's interests were substantial, that the statute's
distinction between commercial and non-commercial faxes directly
relates to these interests, and that the ban on unsolicited commercial
faxes was not overbroad.216 It would seem that these decisions, which
condone broad governmental regulation of an entire mode of
commercial speech,2 17 fly in the face of the Central Hudson-with-teeth
208. Id.
209. See supra notes 171-88 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 201-08 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
212. Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54, 56 (9th Cir. 1995). Considering
the specific issue of whether the ban on junk fax was excessive, the Ninth Circuit held
that the fourth prong was met because unsolicited fax advertisements shift significant
costs to consumers. Id. at 56-57. The Ninth Circuit refused to give credence to the
possibility of future technological advances, which may permit simultaneous fax
transmission and eliminate the need for fax paper. Id. at 57.
213. Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1162, 1169, 1172 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
214. Id. at 1168. Regarding the narrow tailoring requirement, the district court
held that the plaintiff's suggested alternatives to the ban -establishing a do-not-fax
registry, regulating the hours of fax advertising, and limiting the number and
frequency of fax transmissions-do not demonstrate that the TCPA fax provision is
overbroad. Id. at 1168-69.
215. Missouri v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 660 (8th Cir. 2003).
216. Id. at 655-56, 658-60. The Eighth Circuit explained that the fourth prong was
satisfied because advertisers remain free to market their products through any legal
means. Id. at 659.
217. See Amaditz, supra note 56,
22 (noting that such decisions "support an
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analysis and the Court's holding in Bolger, which apparently opposes
bans-as distinct from opt-out systems-on commercial speech.
3. Government Facilitation of Consumer Choice or Government
Speech: Can an Analogy Be Drawn to Opt-Out Systems?
Rowan and Bolger appear to draw a distinction between bans and
opt-out systems regarding unsolicited solicitation. This apparent
distinction may be reinforced by Supreme Court jurisprudence on
government facilitation of consumer choice, which has been upheld by
the Court repeatedly. A prime example of such facilitation of choice
was the Cleveland, Ohio school voucher program upheld by the Court
2 1 In considering whether the program,
in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.
which provided tuition aid for students to attend a participating public
or private school of their parents' choosing, 19 had the effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion, 2 the Court held that "government
aid reaches religious schools only as a result of the genuine and
independent choices of private individuals." 21 The Court's allowance
of such facilitation of consumer choice raises the question: To what
extent are opt-out systems similar?
Alternatively, the distinction between bans and opt-outs may be
reinforced by Supreme Court rulings in the area of government
speech.222 In Regan v. Taxation With Representation, for example, the
Court held that Congress's refusal to grant a non-profit lobby
corporation tax-exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code did
not violate any First Amendment rights or regulate any First
Amendment activity. 223 The Court explained that Congress had
simply refused to pay for Taxation's lobbying. 224 It added: "[wie have
held in several contexts that a legislature's decision not to subsidize
the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right, and
thus is not subject to strict scrutiny. '225 When the government is
speaking rather than facilitating consumer choice, it is free to
discriminate based on subject matter.
If opt-out systems are indeed similar to instances of government
speech-more than they are akin to cases of government facilitation
of consumer choice-then the government can presumably go so far
as to discriminate based on subject matter in formulating an opt-out
advertising ban on an entire communications medium-the fax machine").
218. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 663 (2002).
For additional
discussion of Zelman, see infra note 316 and accompanying text.
219. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 645.
220. Id. at 649.
221. Id.
222. For additional instances besides the one discussed here, see infra notes 310-12
and accompanying text.
223. Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 541-42, 545 (1983).
224. Id. at 546.
225. Id. at 549.
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system. Therefore, the proper classification of opt-out systems as
either government speech or government facilitation of consumer
choice bears critical implications for the constitutionality of the
national do-not-call registry and other conceivable opt-out systems
that target commercial speech only.

III.

SUBJECT MATTER DISCRIMINATION: THE DISPOSITIVE FACTOR
IN DETERMINING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL
UNSOLICITED SOLICITATION REGULATION

A. The Four Quadrantsof UnsolicitedSolicitationRegulation
Part II demonstrates that there are overlapping considerations
when it comes to analyzing the constitutionality of a government
regulation of unsolicited commercial speech. This Note applies the
case law discussed in Part II to four distinct scenarios, so as to address
the intersections of regulation type and content base. Category I
involves a federal ban (i.e., opt-in system) on all unsolicited
solicitations, commercial and non-commercial. Category II involves a
federal ban (i.e., opt-in system) on unsolicited commercial speech
only. Category III involves a federal opt-out system on all unsolicited
solicitations, commercial and non-commercial. Finally, Category IV
involves a federal opt-out system on unsolicited commercial speech
only.
Application within the four categories demonstrates that (1) federal
bans on all unsolicited residence-targeted telemarketing, unsolicited
bulk e-mail, and unsolicited fax are constitutional;226 (2) federal bans
on unsolicited commercial solicitations are unconstitutional; 227 (3)
federal opt-out systems directed at all unsolicited solicitations are
constitutional; 228 and (4) federal opt-out systems targeting unsolicited
commercial solicitations are unconstitutional.2 29
B. Opt-In Systems: CategoriesI and II
1. Category I: Federal Bans on All Unsolicited Solicitations
Since the Central Hudson analysis of commercial speech regulation
was adopted in 1980, it has evolved into a test that, though described
nominally as intermediate scrutiny, is factually much closer to strict
scrutiny.230 However, Central Hudson's near-strict-scrutiny standard is
inapt where the federal law applies to all unsolicited monetary
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

See infra Part III.B.1.
See infra Part III.B.2.
See infra Part III.C.1.
See infra Part III.C.2.
See supra notes 178-88 and accompanying text.
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requests, whether commercial, political, or charitable. Rather, the test
to be applied in such a context is one of true intermediate scrutiny:
[T]he government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time,
place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions "are
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,
that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest, and that they leave open 23ample
alternative channels for
1
communication of the information.,

Under this time, place, or manner test, federal bans on all
unsolicited solicitations would be constitutional as applied to each of
the three modes of communication considered in this Note. Insofar as
they apply to all unsolicited solicitations, such bans would be contentneutral.232
Moreover, the governmental interests of protecting
residential privacy from telemarketing, and eliminating cost-shifting
imposed by UBE and junk fax are both significant and narrowly
tailored.3 3 Finally, banning such forms of unsolicited solicitation
leaves open numerous other means of solicitation, whether solicited
or not.
a. A Federal Ban on All Unsolicited Residence- Targeted
Telemarketing Is Constitutional
To properly appreciate the significance of the governmental interest
in protecting residential privacy, one must understand the unique
231. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v.
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
232. This accords with the plurality opinion in United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S.
720, 736 (1990) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). See supra note 192 and
accompanying text. It also agrees with the majority holding in InternationalSociety
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683 (1992). See supra note 193;
supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text. However, Justice Brennan's dissent in
Kokinda disagreed with the proposition that bans on all unsolicited solicitations are
content-neutral. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 753 (Brennan, J. dissenting); see supra note 193
and accompanying text. Moreover, one particular statement by the Lee Court may
permit an argument that in instances where the government is not acting as a
proprietor-as it was in Lee-but rather, as a lawmaker, such as when it bans all
unsolicited solicitations but not unsolicited non-monetary requests, a heightened
standard of review will apply and subject matter discrimination may invalidate the
law. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 678; see also supra note 196.
233. Bans are not per se overbroad. Frisby v. Schultz stated, "A complete ban can
be narrowly tailored, but only if each activity within the proscription's scope is an
appropriately targeted evil." 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988). In this regard, Frisby discussed
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984), in which the Court upheld
an ordinance that banned all signs on public property with the intent of avoiding
"visual clutter." Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485-86. Frisby explained that the complete ban in
Taxpayers for Vincent was necessary because the substantive evil-"visual clutter"was not simply a possible result of posting signs on public property, but was "'created
by the medium of expression itself."' Id. at 486 (quoting Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. at 810). So too, with each of the modes of solicitation considered herein, the
substantive evils-invasion of residential privacy or cost-shifting-are created by the
media of communication themselves, whether telemarketing, junk fax, or spam.
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status of a home in the eyes of the Supreme Court: It is "'the last
citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick"'" 34 and "the one retreat to
which men and women can repair to escape from the tribulations of
their daily pursuits. '235 The Court has stated emphatically that
"[t]here simply is no right to force speech into the home of an
unwilling listener. ' 236 Clearly, the Court holds residential privacy in
uniquely high esteem.
The huge outpouring of support for the do-not-call registry is
evidence of the significant invasion of privacy posed by
telemarketing. 237 But if that is not evidence enough, congressional
findings prior to the passage of the TCPA substantiated this claim.238
The problem has only worsened in recent years with the advent of
predictive dialing machines. 239
These facts, together with the
singularly important status of the home in Supreme Court
jurisprudence, point to one conclusion: A ban on all unsolicited
residence-targeted telemarketing to further the government interest
of protecting residential privacy will overcome the intermediate
scrutiny standard of the time, place, or manner test.24 °
The federal government may restrict, and even ban,241 this specific
manner of protected speech-all unsolicited residence-targeted
telemarketing-because the ban conforms to the three prongs of the
time, place, or manner test. Regarding prong one, because the ban
would be "'justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech'" 2 42 -applying
to
all
unsolicited
residence-targeted
234. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484 (quoting Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969)
(Black, J., concurring)).
235. Id. (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)).
236. Id. at 485.
237. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
238. The Ninth Circuit discussed these congressional findings in Moser: "Congress
held extensive hearings on telemarketing in 1991. Based upon these hearings, it
concluded that telemarketing calls to homes constituted an unwarranted intrusion
upon privacy." Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 972 (9th Cir. 1995).
239. Id. ("The volume of such calls increased substantially with the advent of
automated devices that dial up to 1,000 phone numbers an hour ....). See supra
note 48 for a description of predictive dialers.
240. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. One commentator has argued that
the Ninth Circuit implied in Moser-a case that upheld the TCPA's ban on
prerecorded or automated telemarketing calls to residential phone lines on the basis
of a congressional finding of invasion of residential privacy-that Congress could
have banned all telemarketing calls as invasions of home privacy. Amaditz, supra note
56, 28. Amaditz stated:
Despite Bolger, courts continue to assert that protection of privacy is a
strong governmental interest. For example, in upholding a federal law that
banned auto-dialed telemarketing in Moser v. FCC, the Ninth Circuit
implied that the ban was reasonable because Congress could have banned all
telemarketing calls as incursions on home privacy.
Id.
241. See supra note 233 for a discussion of why bans are not per se overbroad.
242. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v.
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
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telemarketing because of the invasion of residential privacy it
produces-the ban would be deemed content neutral.
Concerning prong two, as discussed above,243 the ban serves a
significant government interest in preserving the residential privacy
that is threatened by telemarketing.
The clearest proof that
telemarketing presents real harm to residential privacy is that over
fifty million people registered for the do-not-call list in the list's first
few months of existence. 24
This surely resulted from the 2.64
telemarketing calls that the average consumer received weekly prior
to the establishment of the do-not-call registry, 245 and the seven
million daily recipients of such telemarketing calls.246 Moreover, such
a ban would be narrowly tailored insofar as "each activity within the
proscription's scope is an appropriately targeted evil. ' 247 Though not
necessarily the "least restrictive or least intrusive means "248 of
regulating telemarketing, in light of the dominance of commercial
telemarketing as compared to non-commercial telemarketing,249 the
ban's inclusion of non-commercial telemarketing is nonetheless
reasonable given the potential for incremental invasions of privacy
caused by unsolicited non-commercial telemarketing.
Finally, in conformity with prong three, a ban on all unsolicited
residence-targeted telemarketing solicitations leaves open numerous
alternative channels of communicating such unsolicited solicitations,
whether to the home via non-privacy-invasive direct mail,25 ° or outside
the home via solicitations on public premises.25'

243. See supra notes 234-39 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
245. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228, 1240 (10th Cir. 2004); see
supra note 46 and accompanying text.
246. Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 972 (9th Cir. 1995). Note that this statistic is from
1991, before predictive dialers took hold in the late 1990s and increased the time
telemarketers spent talking to a live voice from twenty minutes an hour to fifty
minutes an hour. See supra note 48.
247. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988).
248. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989). The Ward test is not
so demanding; Ward's narrow tailoring prong is satisfied "'so long as the...
regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less
effectively absent the regulation."' Id. at 799 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472
U.S. 675,689 (1985)).
249. See infra note 327 and accompanying text.
250. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 75 (1983).
251. Notably, less comprehensive bans have failed to adequately address the
invasion of privacy presented by telemarketing. For example, although Congress
found in 1991 that automated calls were a greater invasion of privacy than calls placed
by live telemarketers, the TCPA artificial or prerecorded voice provision did not
sufficiently protect residential privacy. If it had, fifty million people would not have
registered for the do-not-call list in its initial months of existence. See Moser, 46 F.3d
at 972 (discussing Congress's finding regarding the relative invasions of privacy of live
telemarketing versus artificial or prerecorded telemarketing); see also supra note 125
(discussing the TCPA's artificial or prerecorded voice provision).
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b. A FederalBan on All Unsolicited Bulk E-mail Is Constitutional
Though the governmental interest in protecting residential privacy
arguably supports a federal ban on all unsolicited residence-targeted
telemarketing, it is not significantly compelling to justify a similar ban
in the context of UBE. Nevertheless, although UBE does not invade
residential privacy to the same extent that telemarketing does,252 it
does shift costs to e-mail users, ISPs, and employers to a degree that
would justify such a ban." 3 Even if the $8.9 billion Ferris Research
estimate amounts to an overstatement of the cost shifted to third
parties, middlemen, and end users, it has been sufficiently
corroborated
to suggest that, at very least, the costs shifted are indeed
25 4
high.
A federal ban on all unsolicited bulk email-a manner regulationwould satisfy the three prongs of the time, place, or manner test. 255 As
with the ban on all unsolicited telemarketing, a ban on UBE would
satisfy prong one because it is not justified by way of reference to the
content of the regulated e-mail, but rather, by reference to the manner
of the e-mail: that which is sent in bulk. Regarding prong two, the
Ferris Research estimate and other studies like it 25 6 suggest that the
government's interest in protecting e-mail users, ISPs, and employers
from cost-shifting is significant. In addition, even if one argues that
the opportunity cost to employers for wasted employee time 257 does
not amount to a real harm, the costs to ISPs that require additional
network bandwidth, memory, and storage space,258 as well as those
imposed on e-mail users whose Internet subscription fee is based on
increments of time spent online 25 9 are no doubt real. The government
has a significant interest in preventing the shifting of such costs.
Furthermore, similar to the analysis of narrow tailoring in the
telemarketing context, a ban on UBE would be reasonable given the
incremental costs shifted by unsolicited solicitations for political and
252. See Sorkin, supra note 7, at 1011 & n.50 ("Phone calls from telemarketers are
generally considered more intrusive than faxes or direct mail, because they are
interactive and because they must be dealt with immediately."). Like junk faxes and
direct mail, spain does not require the urgent attention of the recipient.
253. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 75 for a description of the Ferris Research study, as well as an
additional study that also demonstrated that spammers shift significant costs. See
supra note 92 for evidence that the Ferris Research estimate has been acknowledged
by authoritative entities. See supra note 93 for a discussion of the methodology of the
Ferris Research study.
255. Admittedly, a ban on UBE would apply not only to unsolicited solicitationsthe topic of this Note-but to all forms of bulk e-mail communication, i.e., also to
those that do not involve requests for money. The broad sweep of such a ban would
nevertheless be constitutional for the reasons discussed below.
256. See supra note 75 for reference to a similar study.
257. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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charitable concerns, and the noted deficiencies of narrower bans,
including those of the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003.26 As for prong three,
it too is met because there are countless alternatives to UBE that do
not run afoul of cost-shifting.
c. A Federal Ban on All Unsolicited Fax Is Constitutional
Like UBE, unsolicited fax arguably does not invade residential
privacy in cases where it is directed at the home, despite the
interference it imposes on a home's fax machine. But also similar to
UBE, junk fax shifts costs to the end user in a way that justifies a ban
on all unsolicited fax. Evidence suggests that junk fax shifts to the
recipient more than $100 a year in direct costs,26' which come in the
form of paper, toner, time required to recognize and discard
unwanted faxes, and the temporary inability to send and receive
faxes.262
In accordance with prong two of the time, place, or manner test, the
federal government has a significant interest in protecting junk fax
recipients from these costs. Moreover, despite the effectiveness of the
TCPA at curbing junk fax, a ban on both commercial and noncommercial unsolicited fax would not be overbroad. In the wake of
the TCPA, which prohibited unsolicited commercial fax only,263 the
prevalence of unsolicited fax generally suffered a marked decline.2 "
Nevertheless, expanding the ban on unsolicited fax beyond the scope
of commercial junk fax would be deemed narrowly tailored, since, as
in the case of non-commercial telemarketing,2 65 non-commercial junk
fax shifts some additional costs to the fax machine owner, however
slight.266
Regarding prong one of the time, place, or manner test, a ban on all
unsolicited junk fax would be content-neutral, just as in the
discussions above regarding telemarketing and spam. 267 Furthermore,
there are numerous conceivable ways in which such a ban would leave
260. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 86.
262. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. Of course, this discussion assumes
that the content-based TCPA is constitutional. Whether or not this is, in fact, the case
will be addressed below. See infra Part III.B.2.
265. For the incremental harm argument in the telemarketing context, see supra
notes 248-49 and accompanying text.
266. Even if the TCPA junk fax provision succeeded in eliminating the bulk of junk
fax cost-shifting by banning unsolicited commercial fax, a ban on all unsolicited fax
would be overbroad only if there exists some factual or logical argument that
unsolicited non-commercial fax imposes zero costs on the recipient. Since no such
argument seems apparent, the assumption that unsolicited non-commercial fax shifts
incremental costs to the fax machine owner renders a ban on all unsolicited fax
narrowly tailored.
267. See supra Parts III.B..a.-b.
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open ample alternative means of communicating the information
contained in unsolicited faxes, as demanded by prong three.
d. How the Above Arguments Fit with Rowan and Bolger
Recall that one commentator theorized how, under Rowan2 68 and
Bolger,26 9 opt-out systems that are applied to unsolicited solicitations
will survive the Court's scrutiny whereas outright bans will not.27 °
However, that same commentator concluded that "the government's
interest is more likely to withstand scrutiny" when private individuals
act in such situations rather than the government.2 1 This hedged
argument suggests that the commentator correctly recognizes that the
Court has spoken on point only to the issue of direct mail, and
specifically, how it relates to invasion of privacy. While extrapolating
from Rowan and Bolger suggests how the Court might conclude
regarding other types of unsolicited communication, there are key
differences that argue against such generalization.
A fundamental rationale for the Bolger holding is the Court's
recognition that a direct mail recipient could avoid the offensiveness
posed by such communications simply by averting his eyes, and that
discarding such direct mail in the garbage is a constitutionally
reasonable burden. 272 But the Court has implied-albeit in dictathat it may conclude otherwise in the context of telemarketing: "One
may hang up on an indecent phone call, but that option does not give
the caller a constitutional immunity or avoid a harm that has already
taken place.1 273 In other words, telemarketing is more intrusive of
residential privacy than direct mail, so much so that the Court may
find that a recipient cannot, without suffering harm to his privacy,
perform the equivalent of averting his eyes or trashing the call simply
by hanging up.
Likewise, Bolger ultimately may not prove to act as a precedent for
a federal ban on all UBE or all junk fax because the government
interest in prevention of cost-shifting that supports such regulations
268. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970); see supra notes
197-200 and accompanying text.
269. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); see supra notes 20106 and accompanying text.
270. For a discussion of Kenneth Amaditz's theory, see supra notes 207-08 and
accompanying text.
271. Amaditz, supra note 56,
27. Amaditz's choice of words is by no means
haphazard. He hedges a second time soon thereafter: "Although Moser indicates
that protection of privacy could support a complete ban, Rowan and Bolger teach that
courts are most likely to uphold this governmental interest when legislation enables
the consumer to 'opt-out' of certain advertising." Id. at 28; see also supra notes 20708 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
273. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978); see also supra note 103 and
accompanying text.
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bears no relationship to the government interest of preserving
residential privacy at play in Bolger. The Court may very well not
require UBE and junk fax recipients or middlemen to avert their eyes
from the costs being shifted to them. Certainly, it is conceivable that
the Court would conclude that the costs borne by such individuals and
entities are not reasonable burdens under the Constitution. Thus,
seemingly, Rowan and Bolger can be reconciled without undermining
the argument above that federal bans on all unsolicited telemarketing,
all UBE, and all junk fax would be constitutional.
2. Category II: Federal Bans on Unsolicited Commercial Speech
Only
Whereas Category I bans need only be analyzed from a limitationon-speech perspective because of their content-neutrality, 27 4 Category
II bans entail both speech restriction and subject matter
discrimination. Consequently, Category II bans require a twofold
analysis that focuses individually on the above two characteristics.
Should the Category II bans implicate either an unconstitutional form
of speech restriction or subject matter discrimination, they will be held
unconstitutional.
a. The Central Hudson Inquiry as Applied to Such Bans
Unlike the proposed federal bans on all unsolicited solicitations,
which-because of their content-neutrality-were examined above
according to the intermediate scrutiny time, place, or manner test,275
federal bans on unsolicited commercial speech only must
be analyzed
2 76
under the near-strict scrutiny Central Hudson standard.
i. CentralHudson as Applied to a Ban on Unsolicited Commercial
Telemarketing
Assuming that commercial telemarketing satisfies the first prong of
Central Hudson,277 such a ban would still meet prongs two, three, and
four, and thus be constitutional. 8 Concerning Central Hudson's
274. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
275. See supra Parts III.B.l.a.-c.
276. The Central Hudson test is set forth supra notes 173-75 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the Central Hudson's near-strict scrutiny characteristics, see
supra notes 178-91 and accompanying text.
277. To be protected by the First Amendment, the commercial speech-in this
case, commercial telemarketing-must relate to lawful activity and not be misleading.
See supra note 174 and accompanying text. Though commercial telemarketing can
sometimes be misleading, the satisfaction of the first prong will be conceded for the
sake of argument, so as to demonstrate that a ban on commercial telemarketing is
constitutional nevertheless.
278. It is conceded that the CentralHudson Court itself was wary of justifying bans
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second prong, which requires that the government's interest in
imposing the regulation be substantial, it is necessary to recognize that
the telemarketing practice as a whole is heavily dominated by
unsolicited commercial communications. 279 As a result, the federal

government's interests in preserving residential privacy in the face of
unsolicited commercial telemarketing is nearly as substantial as it is in

the case of a ban on all unsolicited telemarketing. 2s0
This
substantiality is sufficient to satisfy Central Hudson's second prong.
Moreover, a ban on commercial telemarketing would satisfy Central
Hudson's demanding third prong,"' since there is a real harm posed

by telemarketing28 2 and that harm-invasion of residential privacy-

would be materially alleviated by a ban on its primary cause:
commercial telemarketing.
Finally, in accordance with Central
Hudson's fourth prong, a ban on unsolicited commercial
telemarketing would not be broader than necessary to promote the
federal government's interest of preserving residential privacy. After
all, the ban targets the primary culprit of invasions of privacy caused
by telemarketing -unsolicited
commercial telemarketing -while
leaving alone the less intrusive offender: unsolicited non-commercial
telemarketing.
ii. CentralHudson as Applied to a Ban on Unsolicited Commercial

E-mail
Assuming, as in the case of commercial telemarketing discussed
above, that Central Hudson's first prong is satisfied,283 prongs two,
on commercial speech on the basis of policy interests, like preserving residential
privacy (as in the case of telemarketing) or protection from cost-shifting (as in the
case of spam or junk fax). The CentralHudson Court stated, "We review with special
care regulations that entirely suppress commercial speech in order to pursue a
nonspeech-related policy. In those circumstances, a ban on speech could screen from
public view the underlying governmental policy." Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980). Nevertheless, the policy interests of
preserving residential privacy and protection from cost-shifting are arguably
significant enough to satisfy such special care review in the case of commercial
telemarketing, UCE, and commercial junk fax.
279. See infra note 327 and accompanying text regarding the proportion of
commercial telemarketing as compared to telemarketing as a whole.
280. For a discussion of the government's significant interest in preserving
residential privacy via a ban on all unsolicited telemarketing, see supra notes 234-40,
243-46 and accompanying text.
281. For a statement of the third prong as enunciated by the CentralHudson Court,
see supra note 175 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Court's subsequent
elaboration of the third prong's rigorous demands, see supra note 180 and
accompanying text.
282. For evidence of the real harm posed by telemarketing, see supra notes 237-39,
244-46 and accompanying text.
283. Recall that to merit First Amendment protection, commercial speech must
relate to lawful activity and not be misleading. See supra note 174 and accompanying
text. Often, spam involves deceptive content and/or routing information, an issue that
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three, and four are also arguably met, thereby rendering a ban on all
unsolicited commercial e-mail constitutional.
Regarding Central
Hudson's second prong, it is necessary to recognize that just like
telemarketing, spam is primarily comprised of unsolicited commercial
communications." 4 As such, the government has a substantial interest
in banning UCE, the primary cause of the significant cost-shifting
imposed by UBE.2 85 Central Hudson's third prong is also satisfied,
insofar as the cost-shifting phenomenon is real 86 and a ban on UCEthe overwhelming source of sparn cost-shifting -will materially
alleviate such cost-shifting. Lastly, Central Hudson's fourth prong is
met since a ban on UCE is far from overbroad, seeing as it does not
target other, less blameworthy perpetrators of spain cost-shifting, such
as non-commercial bulk e-mailers.
iii. CentralHudson as Applied to a Ban on Unsolicited Commercial
Fax
It is also necessary to investigate whether a ban on unsolicited
commercial fax, as embodied by the TCPA fax provision,287 satisfies
Central Hudson, as indeed federal courts have held.288 As in the two
inquiries above concerning commercial telemarketing and UCE, it
will be assumed for the sake of argument that Central Hudson's first
prong is satisfied. In accordance with Central Hudson's second prong,
the government has a substantial interest in protecting commercial
junk fax recipients from the average $100 in costs they must bear each
year as a result of unsolicited fax advertisements. 28 9 Likewise, Central
Hudson's third prong is met because unsolicited commercial faxes
comprise the bulk of junk fax cost-shifting.2 9 ° As such, the real harms
posed by junk fax cost-shifting are materially alleviated by a ban on
commercial junk fax only. Finally, the fourth prong of Central
Hudson is satisfied for reasons amply noted by federal courts: The
various alternatives that have been proposed-establishing a do-notis the primary target of the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003. See supra note 147 and
accompanying text. Nevertheless, for the sake of arguing that a ban on UCE is
constitutional, it is conceded here that prong one is satisfied.
284. See supra note 62 and accompanying text regarding the proportion of UCE as
compared to UBE as a whole.
285. For a discussion of the costs shifted by spam to third parties, middlemen, and
end-users, see supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
286. Even if the $8.9 billion Ferris Research estimate overstates the cost shifted to
third parties, middlemen, and end users, it has been sufficiently corroborated to
suggest that, at very least, the costs shifted are high. See supra note 75 for a
description of the Ferris Research study, as well as an additional study that also
demonstrated that spammers shift significant costs. See supra note 92 for evidence
that the Ferris Research estimate has been acknowledged by authoritative entities.
287. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 211-17 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 86.
290. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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fax registry, regulating the hours of fax advertising, and limiting the
number and frequency of fax transmissions-fail to establish that the
TCPA fax ban is overbroad, 29 1 and junk fax advertisers still have
numerous legal means of marketing available to them.292
b. The Issue of Subject Matter DiscriminationRegardingSuch Bans
Although it is contended above that bans on commercial
telemarketing, UCE, and commercial junk faxing satisfy Central
Hudson, such bans must also be examined as regulations that involve
subject matter discrimination. 29 3 Recall that despite the high pedestal
on which the Supreme Court placed content-neutrality in the Mosley
decision, 294 the Bolger Court stated in dicta that content-based
restrictions on commercial speech may be permissible.295
Discovery Network296 has been cited as evidence that the Supreme
Court remains in a Mosley-like posture-averse to content-based
bans-even where such bans discriminate against commercial
speech. 297 But because the ban in Discovery Network failed Central
Hudson's test, the Court explicitly left unanswered the question
whether, under different circumstances, a community might be
constitutionally able to discriminate based on subject matter in the
way that Cincinnati had unconstitutionally done. 298 Read together,
one might surmise-albeit incorrectly -that
this allowance by
Discovery Network and the dicta in Bolger suggest that content-based

291. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
293. For a discussion of subject matter discrimination, see supra Part II.A.
294. Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); see also supra note 158 and
accompanying text.
295. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); see also supra notes
159-60 and accompanying text.
296. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993); see also
supra note 182 and accompanying text.
297. See, e.g., Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1166 (D.
Colo. 2003). The Colorado district court stated:
In Discovery Network, the Supreme Court recognized content discrimination
as the primary flaw in the city's regulation of news racks. The city's
regulation failed under the First Amendment because the regulation
distinguished between commercial and noncommercial speech, despite the
fact that there was no evidence that the commercial use of news racks was
more harmful to city beautification than other uses of news racks.
Id. (citations omitted). But see Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228,
1239 (10th Cir. 2004) ("[S]o long as a commercial speech regulation materially
furthers its objectives, underinclusiveness is not fatal under Central Hudson."). It
should be noted that both the Colorado district court and the Tenth Circuit were
discussing Discovery Network and subject matter discrimination in the context of an
opt-out system-the national do-not-call registry-rather than a ban. See supra notes
134-40 and accompanying text.
298. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. at 428.
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bans on unsolicited commercial telemarketing,
UCE, and unsolicited
2 99
commercial fax are constitutional.
Yet despite the Discovery Network Court's curious willingness to
leave the subject matter discrimination question open, the Court has
been quite explicit about its rejection of bans that discriminate against
speech on the basis of subject matter, even where CentralHudson has
been satisfied. In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, the Court
struck down as facially invalid a city ordinance that banned all
billboards except commercial billboards on business premises despite
the fact that the ordinance satisfied the requirements of Central
Hudson."' The Court reasoned: "San Diego has chosen to favor
certain kinds of messages-such as onsite commercial advertising, and
3 1 Such
temporary political campaign advertisements-over others.""
favoritism rendered the ordinance unconstitutional.
More generally, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court held that the
First Amendment imposes "a 'content discrimination' limitation upon
a State's prohibition of proscribable speech. 30 2 Just as R.A.V.
suggests that a ban on all unsolicited telemarketing, UBE, and junk
fax solicitations would be constitutionally sound, it is evident that a
ban that singles
out commercial speech-such as the TCPA-would
30 3
be invalidated.
299. The logic of such an erroneous conclusion would be as follows: The contentbased ban in Discovery Network failed because of the small number of commercial
newsracks relative to the total number of newsracks in Cincinnati. See infra notes 32526 and accompanying text. By contrast, commercial telemarketing, spain, and fax all
comprise the vast majority of unsolicited communications sent in their respective
media, and therefore are responsible for the majority of privacy invasions and costshifting suffered by recipients of such speech. Regarding commercial junk fax as
compared to total junk fax, see supra note 212 and accompanying text. Concerning
UCE as compared to total UBE, see supra note 62 and accompanying text. With
reference to commercial telemarketing as compared to total telemarketing, see infra
note 327 and accompanying text. One might conclude-incorrectly -that as a result,
a ban on commercial speech in each of these three unsolicited advertising contexts
ought to be justifiable, since it would advance governmental interests to a degree that
the Discovery Network ordinance did not.
300. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 493, 495-96, 507-12
(1981).
301. Id. at 519.
302. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992). In R.A.V., the defendants
were charged under a St. Paul ordinance for burning a cross on a neighboring black
family's lawn. Id. at 379. The ordinance forbade placing on public or private property
any object that "'arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender."' Id. at 380. The Court held the ordinance facially
unconstitutional, reasoning that those who wish to use so-called "fighting words" for
purposes other than those enumerated in the ordinance-such as the expression of
hostility grounded in political affiliation-are exempt from the statute's prohibitions.
Id. at 391. The Court explained that the First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to
prohibit only that speech which concerns unpopular topics. Id.
303. Admittedly, R.A. V. does not entirely prohibit content-based discrimination in
areas of speech that may be constitutionally restricted, such as commercial speech.
The R.A.V. Court stated, "Even the prohibition against content discrimination that
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Although Category II bans surmount the Central Hudson test for
restriction on commercial speech, the bans are unconstitutional
because they discriminate on the basis of subject matter. As is clear
from Metromedia, both inquiries of the dual analysis applied to
Category II bans must be satisfied in order for the ban to be upheld." 4
C. Opt-Out Systems: CategoriesIII and IV
1. Category III: A Federal Opt-Out System Directed at All
Unsolicited Solicitations
Imagine the full field of government regulation as a spectrum, with
bans lying at one extreme and opt-out systems residing at the other.3" 5
This metaphor does not, however, imply that all bans offend the
constitution whereas all opt-outs are satisfactory. Bolger suggests that
bans may indeed be unconstitutional.3 6 Yet this Note has argued that
content-neutral bans on all unsolicited telemarketing, UBE, or junk
fax would be upheld.3 7
Likewise, Rowan demonstrates the
probability that the Supreme Court will uphold opt-out systems
constructed to regulate unsolicited solicitations.3" 8 Yet Category IV
regulations may or may not prove unconstitutional given the fact that
they utilize subject matter discrimination to achieve their ends.30 9 But
what of Category III regulations? Opt-out systems may be likened to
either of the two types of government regulation that lie near them on
we assert the First Amendment requires is not absolute. It applies differently in the
context of proscribable speech than in the area of fully protected speech." Id. at 387.
Nevertheless, R.A.V. makes specific reference to an example of prohibited contentbased discrimination in the realm of commercial speech, stating that while a state may
choose to regulate price advertising in one particular "industry" prone to fraud, it
may not bar only that commercial advertising that depicts men in a demeaning
fashion. Id. at 388-89. So too with the telemarketing, spam, and junk fax "industries."
The federal government may opt to regulate-and even ban-such practices in their
entirety, because of the invasion of residential privacy and cost-shifting that they
impose. Yet the federal government may not single out for regulation or ban the
commercial forms of such "industries" only, since that constitutes subject matter
discrimination.
304. See supra notes 300-01 and accompanying text.
305. Government inaction, i.e., failure to regulate, does not lie on this regulatory
spectrum. The spectrum consists only of modes of government activity, not
government inactivity. See supra Part I.B.3. for a discussion of Zelman v. SimmonsHarris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), and the question as to what extent government
facilitation of consumer choice is similar to government creation of an opt-out system.
That question is addressed below.
306. For Kenneth Amaditz's interpretation of Bolger in light of Rowan, see supra
notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
307. See supra Part II.B.1. regarding the constitutionality of Category I
regulations.
308. For Amaditz's understanding of Rowan as a result of Bolger, see supra notes
207-08 and accompanying text.
309. See infra Part III.C.2. for a discussion of the constitutionality of Category IV
regulations.
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the regulatory spectrum: (1) government speech or (2) government
facilitation of consumer choice.
Concerning regulation type (1), government speech, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that government may provide incentives for
a particular activity without being thought to have discriminated
against its alternative.3"' The Court highlighted this distinction in
Maher v. Roe, which involved a state welfare department regulation
that limited state Medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions to
those that were medically necessary.3"'
The Court upheld the
regulation, explaining:
There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a
protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity
consonant with legislative policy. Constitutional concerns are
greatest when the State attempts to impose its will by force of law;
the State's power to encourage actions
deemed to be in the public
312
interest is necessarily far broader.
One possible argument is that opt-out systems may be likened to
"state encouragement of an alternative activity" 31 3-i.e., instances of
government speech. Maher tells us that in such a regulatory capacity,
'
the state's power is "necessarily far broader,"314
implying that as a
speaker, the government may even go so far as to discriminate on the
basis of subject matter. In the words of Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of the University of Virginia, another government speech case,
government has the right "to regulate the content of what is or is not

310. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,178,192-93 (1991) (upholding a federal
act which authorized granting money to family planning organizations, except those
that utilize abortion as a method of family planning, because the government did not
discriminate on the basis of "viewpoint" but rather, simply chose to fund one activity
at the exclusion of another). Rust explained the permissibility of subject matter
discrimination in this context from a consequentialist perspective: "To hold that the
Government unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of viewpoint when it
chooses to fund a program dedicated to advance certain permissible goals, because
the program in advancing those goals necessarily discourages alternative goals, would
render numerous Government programs constitutionally suspect." Id. at 194. For
another example of a government speech case, see supra notes 222-25 and
accompanying text, discussing Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540
(1983).
311. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 466 (1977).
312. Id. at 475-76 (citation omitted). The Court added that the regulation placed
no obstacles in the path of a woman who sought an abortion. Id. at 474. Although the
state made childbirth a more attractive option due to lack of funding for an abortion,
it imposed no restriction on access to abortions that did not already exist. Id.
Although indigence made it difficult for some women to procure abortions, the
regulation did not create such poverty. Id. The Court analogized the regulation to a
state's policy choice to fund public-but not private-education. Id. at 477. In neither
case, the Court stated, must the state demonstrate a compelling interest in support of
such policies. Id.
313. Id. at 475.
314. Id. at 476.
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expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to

convey its own message. "315

An alternative argument is that opt-out systems may be equated
with the more limiting type (2) regulations: government facilitation of
consumer choice. In Zelman, the Court upheld the Cleveland school
vouchers program because it was "entirely neutral with respect to
religion[,] ... provide[d] benefits directly to a wide spectrum of
individuals, ... [and] permit[ted] such individuals to exercise genuine
'
choice among options public and private, secular and religious."3 16
The language of the Court stresses that such government facilitation
of consumer choice is permitted only so as long as there is no instance
of subject matter discrimination. The government may only facilitate
consumer choice by presenting the public with a vast array of options,
thus rendering the citizenry's choice genuine. As such, likening optout systems to government facilitation of consumer choice requires
that opt-outs be content-neutral to pass constitutional muster.
Regardless of whether one analogizes opt-out systems to instances
of government speech, or to government facilitation of consumer
choice, it is clear that Category III regulations-opt-out systems that
do not run afoul of content-based problems because they apply both
to commercial and non-commercial solicitations- are constitutional.
Nevertheless, a question that bears critical implications for the
constitutionality of Category IV regulations concerns why a
' in Category III. Is
government's power is "necessarily far broader"317
it because Category III involves (a) an opt-out system; (b) no subject
matter discrimination; or (c) both (a) and (b)? In other words, which
is the better analogy: opt-outs to government facilitation of consumer
choice, or opt-outs to government speech?
2. Category IV: A Federal Opt-Out System Directed at Unsolicited
Commercial Speech Only
In analyzing the constitutionality of the national do-not-call
registry-a Category IV regulation-the Colorado district court in

315. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
Rosenberger held that a university's refusal to pay the printing costs of a newspaper
published by a qualified student group because the newspaper "'promote[d] or
manifest[ed] a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality"' violated the
group's First Amendment right to free speech. Id. at 822-27, 837. In doing so, the
Court distinguished between the university's own preferred message and what was at
stake in this case: the private speech of its students. Id. at 834. Rosenberger stated
that Rust stood for the same principles: "We recognized [in Rust] that when the
government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is
entitled to say what it wishes." Id. at 833. For a discussion of Rust, see supra note 310.
316. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662 (2002). For a discussion of
Zelman, see supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.
317. Maher,432 U.S. at 476.
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Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. v. FTC18 tended to view the
answer to the above question as (c):
Government's power in
Category III is expansive because Category III regulations involve (a)
opt-out systems that (b) do not discriminate based on subject matter.
In doing so, the district court stated that a content-discriminatory optout system such as the do-not-call registry is not legitimately neutral,
since it fails to provide consumers with a wide-ranging set of
options.3 9 The district court explained what it perceived as the effect
of the FTC's decision to target commercial speech only: "The
mechanism purportedly created by the FTC to effectuate consumer
choice instead influences consumer choice, thereby entangling the
government in deciding what speech consumers should hear."32
Yet the Mainstream district court stopped short of hanging the
constitutionality of opt-out systems on their content neutrality: "The
First Amendment prohibits the government from enacting laws
creating a preference for certain types of speech based on content,
without asserting a valid interest, premised on content, to justify its
discrimination. Because the do-not-call registry distinguishes between
the indistinct, it is unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 3I
To this end, the Mainstream Marketing district court analogized the
national do-not-call registry to the failed Cincinnati ordinance in
Discovery Network,3 22 stating that the Supreme Court invalidated the
Cincinnati ordinance because of the lack of evidence that commercial
newsracks were more harmful aesthetically than noncommercial
newsracks.3 23 But the district court's reference to Discovery Network
as precedent for its decision is misplaced, as key factual differences
exist between these two cases.324
In Discovery Network, the Court found that the city's asserted
interests of beautification and safety were unrelated to the contentbased distinction made by the ban.3 25 But the Court's determination
that the ban lacked a reasonable fit to the city's interests turned on the

318. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Colo. 2003),
stay denied by 284 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (D. Colo. 2003), stay granted by 345 F.3d 850 (10th
Cir. 2003), rev'd, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004).
319. The Colorado district court stated: "Were the do-not-call registry to apply
without regard to the content of the speech, or to leave autonomy in the hands of the
individual, as in Rowan, it might be a different matter." Id. at 1168.
320. Id. at 1163.
321. Id. at 1168.
322. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993); see also
supra note 182 and accompanying text.
323. MainstreamMktg. Servs., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1166.
324. FTC lawyers highlighted these key factual differences following the Colorado
district court ruling. See Adam Liptak, No-Call List: Hard Choices, N.Y. Times, Sept.
27, 2003, at Al. The Tenth Circuit acknowledged these distinctions in its decision
upholding the do-not-call registry. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d
1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 2004).
325. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. at 412, 430.
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numbers involved; it noted the "paltry" benefit yielded by removing
sixty-two commercial newsracks while 1,500 to 2,000 non-commercial
newsracks remained.32 6 In contrast, the proportion of commercial
telemarketing vis-A-vis non-commercial telemarketing is far greater,
with estimates of commercial telemarketing totaling anywhere from
forty to eighty percent of all telemarketing.327 Such numbers suggest
that there is indeed a valid content-based interest justifying the
registry's discrimination between commercial and non-commercial
speech.328
While the Mainstream Marketing district court erroneously likened

the national do-not-call registry to the Cincinnati ordinance in
Discovery Network, the registry-and other content-based opt-outs
like it-ought to fail anyway. The dispositive point lies in opt-out
326. Regarding this "paltry" benefit, the Discovery Network Court stated, "The
benefit to be derived from the removal of 62 newsracks while about 1,500-2,000
remain in place was considered 'minute' by the District Court and 'paltry' by the
Court of Appeals. We share their evaluation of the 'fit' between the city's goal and its
method of achieving it." Id. at 417-18. The Court noted that the fact that the ban
provided only the slightest incremental support of the government's asserted interests
supported the holding that the prohibition was unconstitutional. Id. at 427. A ban on
sixty-two of 2000 newsracks amounts to roughly three percent. Liptak, supra note 324.
327. The Mainstream Marketing district court judge stated that estimates indicate
that forty to sixty percent of telemarketing calls will be affected by the do-not-call
registry. MainstreamMktg. Servs., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1157. FTC lawyers estimate
that blocking commercial telemarketing could eliminate as much as eighty percent of
telemarketing calls. Liptak, supra note 324.
328. The district court judge in Mainstream Marketing ruled that numbers are not
the decisive factor. Liptak, supra note 324. Rather, the Mainstream Marketing district
court stated the dispositive issue as follows: "If the government avoids regulating
certain fronts in attempting to materially advance its interest, however, it cannot
justify its abstention on these fronts based on the content of the speech." Mainstream
Mktg. Servs., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1166. But Discovery Network demonstrates that
the calculation is, at least to some extent, a numbers issue. Some federal appeals
courts have interpreted Discovery Network to mean as much. In upholding the TCPA
ban on junk fax, the Eighth Circuit distinguished Discovery Network insofar as
commercial newsracks only constituted a small percentage of newsracks on Cincinnati
streets, whereas commercial faxes comprise a large proportion of all unsolicited faxes.
Missouri v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 656 n.4 (8th Cir. 2003). The Ninth
Circuit agreed in upholding the same law, distinguishing Discovery Network from the
ban on junk fax because in the former, the content-based ban only involved a small
share of the total number of newsracks. Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 46 F.3d
54, 56 (9th Cir. 1995). Similarly, the Tenth Circuit in MainstreamMarketing suggested
that the constitutionality of content-based regulations on commercial speech boils
down to numbers. Distinguishing the impact of the law in Mainstream Marketing
from that in Discovery Network, the Tenth Circuit stated:
So far, more than 50 million telephone numbers have been registered on the
do-not-call list, and the do-not-call regulations protect these households
from receiving most unwanted telemarketing calls. According to the
telemarketers' own estimate, 2.64 telemarketing calls per week-or more
than 137 calls annually-were directed at an average consumer before the
do-not-call list came into effect. Accordingly, absent the do-not-call registry,
telemarketers would call those consumers who have already signed up for
the registry an estimated total of 6.85 billion times each year.
Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 358 F.3d at 1240 (citation omitted).
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systems' ultimate similarity to government facilitation of consumer
choice, as opposed to government speech. The Tenth Circuit in
Mainstream Marketing implied as much with its choice of words
describing the registry: "The national do-not-call registry offers
consumers a tool with which they can protect their homes against
intrusions that Congress has determined to be particularly invasive."3 9
The registry is a consumer-enabling mechanism provided by the
government, rather than a proper expression of government opinion.
By establishing the do-not-call registry, the government is not
speaking, nor is it utilizing private entities to deliver its own
message.330 Just as in Rosenberger, where the Supreme Court held
that the University of Virginia had unconstitutionally imposed its own
preferred message on the private speech of its students,33 the federal
government has inserted its desired message-by limiting the public's
choice to opt out of commercial telemarketing only-into a situation
where it is neither speaking for itself nor enlisting private bodies to
convey its message.
The essential nature of opt-out systems is that they permit the
public to speak. Similar to the Ohio voucher program in Zelman,332
the primary goal of opt-out systems is to facilitate consumer choice.
When the government's message enters the dialogue, thereby
encroaching on public speech and limiting choice, the opt-out system
inevitably must fail.
The Tenth Circuit in Mainstream Marketing overlooked this critical
point. Misperceiving unassisted and government-assisted consumer
speech as essentially alike, the Tenth Circuit stated, "Just as a
consumer can avoid door-to-door peddlers by placing a 'No
Solicitation' sign in his or her front yard, the do-not-call registry lets
consumers avoid unwanted sales pitches that invade the home via
'
telephone, if they choose to do so."333
In fact, the former scenario is
not analogous to the latter; once the government intervenes by
facilitating consumer choice, it must provide consumers with the full
range of available options rather than limit those options on the basis
of their subject matter.
D. Recommendations
Since the federal government has staggered its adoption of
regulations over unsolicited communications, one may posit

329. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 358 F.3d at 1233.
330. The reference is to Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia,
515 U.S. 819 (1995). See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
331. For a discussion of Rosenberger, see supra note 315.
332. For a discussion of Zelman, see supra notes 218-21, 316 and accompanying
text.
333. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 358 F.3d at 1233.
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The

1. Junk Fax: Stick with the Status Quo
The ban on unsolicited commercial fax-itself the most
longstanding federal regulation on unsolicited communicationsprovides the clearest indication of how to go forward: do not change a
thing. This argument is submitted despite this Note's contention that
a federal ban on all unsolicited fax would be constitutional,3 34 and
particularly despite this Note's claim that the TCPA junk fax
provision-being a Category II federal ban on unsolicited commercial
solicitations-would be held unconstitutional."' Since the TCPA fax
provision succeeded in fostering a significant decline in the quantity of
junk fax,33 6 a comprehensive ban on junk fax-though constitutionalis simply unnecessary. Moreover, Congress need not anticipate the
Supreme Court's invalidation of the TCPA, though this Note
maintains such invalidation is the logical conclusion of the Court's
jurisprudence on such matters. Especially in light of the TCPA's
practical achievements, Congress ought to amend the TCPA only if
the Court requires it to do so.
2. Telemarketing: Stick with the Status Quo
As for the case of telemarketing, clear conclusions present
themselves less readily on account of the recent legal challenges to the
do-not-call registry3 37 and the lack of elapsed time to indicate whether
the initiative will prove successful in practice. Assuming the national
do-not-call registry survives its current legal limbo despite the
predictions of this Note,338 some time should be afforded to permit the
registry to demonstrate its potential for success. Only afterwards-if
its failure is apparent-should a federal ban or opt-out system on all
telemarketing solicitations be adopted, even though this Note suggests
such a ban or opt-out system would be constitutional.33 9 After all, as
one commentator noted, the regulation is "most likely" to survive
judicial scrutiny as an opt-out system 3 40-albeit, according to this
Note, a content-neutral opt-out system. 4 ' There is simply no reason
to craft constitutionally-debatable legislation unnecessarily, that is, of
334. See supra Part III.B.l.c.
335. See supra Part III.B.2.b. In particular, see supra note 303 and accompanying
text.
336. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 10-15, 134-41 and accompanying text.
338. See supra Part III.C.2.
339. See supra Parts III.B.1, III.C.1.
340. Amaditz, supra note 56, 28.
341. See supra Part III.C. (discussing Category III and Category IV opt-out
systems).
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course, unless the mode of communications to be regulated threatens
to undermine an entire system of communications.
3. Spam: Enact a Federal Ban on UBE
The above caveat refers directly to the case of spam.
Commentators surmise that if left unchecked, spain jeopardizes the
very existence of e-mail as a communications medium.342 Even prior
to being signed into law by President Bush, many critics worried aloud
that the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, with its corresponding do-not-email
registry, is far too impotent to alleviate this problem. 343 Tougher state
laws-such as the Delaware and California anti-spain laws 3 "-are
better suited for the task. But they run aground on account of federal
preemption issues,345 potential dormant commerce clause problems,34 6
and general impracticality. 347 This is a critical moment that excepts
the rule. If, as this Note contends, a federal ban on UBE would be
constitutional, 341 it ought to be implemented immediately. Such a
broad ban is necessary given this Note's contention that a federal ban
on UCE-the primary source of the cost-shifting problem 34 9 -would
not pass constitutional muster.350
CONCLUSION

At the time of this writing, telemarketing industry representatives
have yet to make a decision on whether to appeal the Tenth Circuit
ruling in Mainstream Marketing, either to the Tenth Circuit en banc or
to the Supreme Court.351 If the industry proceeds with an appeal to
the Supreme Court, it is not clear that the Court would be willing to
hear it, because there is currently no disagreement on the matter
among federal courts of appeals.
Mainstream Marketing notwithstanding, it is clear that contentbased federal bans on unsolicited solicitations offend the

342. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
343. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 26, 112 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text. There is only a possibility that
such state statutes contravene the dormant Commerce Clause. The current state of
the law on the matter is unclear. See also supra note 114 (discussing possible due
process problems with state spain laws).
347. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
348. See supra Part III.B.1.b.
349. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
350. See supra Part III.B.2.
351. Mayer, supra note 5; Stout, supra note 15. If brought, the appeal would
challenge the ruling in Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir.
2004).
352. Stout, supra note 15.
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Constitution, 3 3 whereas content-neutral federal bans and opt-outs are
constitutional 354 -even despite the near-strict scrutiny Central Hudson
standard355 where it applies.
A closer question, however, is whether opt-out systems that
discriminate based on subject matter-like the do-not-call registryare constitutionally problematic. In Mainstream Marketing, the Tenth
Circuit held that such opt-out systems are constitutional.356 This Note
has argued otherwise, because such content-based opt-out systems fail
to present consumers with real choice.

7

In one regard, there is absolutely no question: masses of Americans
have demanded relief from the nuisances and costs of unsolicited
solicitations. However, that solution must not come at the expense of
a fundamental judicial principle concerning speech, even that of the
commercial variety: subject matter discrimination is rarely tolerated.

353. See supra Part III.B.2.
354. See supra Parts III.B.1., III.C.1.
355. For a discussion of Central Hudson's near-strict scrutiny characteristics, see
supra notes 178-91 and accompanying text.
356. For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit holding in Mainstream Marketing, see
supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
357. See supra Part III.C.2.

